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Purpose of the study  
The purpose of this study is to offer an overview on spectrum management methods and to provide 
a detailed analysis of one of them, namely the Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP). This thesis 
discusses the background, purpose and determination of AIP by first shortly introducing the 
alternatives for AIP and then critically assessing the alternative ways to construct such payments.  
 
The main economic models discussed include the opportunity cost based theory by Smith and 
NERA (1996) as well the subsequent, more refined model by Levine and Rickman (2007), which 
extends the Smith-NERA methodology to account for market structure and interference constraints. 
These models and the alternative ways of assigning frequencies are critically viewed against their 
core assumptions, regulator’s objectives for spectrum management as well as from the point of view 
of economic efficiency. 
 
Methodology 
The study is conducted as a literature review combining literature and publications from scientific 
research regarding spectrum management and formation of AIP payments, consultative research 
commissioned by the telecommunications authorities as well as publicly available information on 
realized market transactions for spectrum.  
 
Results of the study 
Taking into account the growing demand and utilization of spectrum resources and given its 
scarcity, spectrum management and efficiency of use is crucial. Traditional administrative 
allocation and assignment methods need to be replaced by market based methods or complemented 
by market mimicking methods such as the AIP in order to fulfill efficiency.  
 
AIP payments are currently constructed through three different kinds of methods basing the 
payment either on the concept of opportunity cost, realized market prices or treating the formation 
as an optimization problem where the regulator maximizes overall welfare with respect to the 
spectrum fee given the interference and resource constraints. The latter method (by Levine and 
Rickman) combines economic modelling and information theory arriving at a group of equations 
determining optimal AIP. The key conclusion is that in a setting where interference, market 
structure and overall welfare including consumer and producer surplus as well as the revenue 
impact for the government from imposing AIP are accounted for, the optimal AIP should be higher 
whenever spectrum sharing is possible. The AIP then act as Ramsey tax across sectors of the 
economy being inversely related to the elasticity of demand. 
 
The method by Levine and Rickman explicitly accounts for most of the crucial elements of 
spectrum and spectrum markets, but further studies are needed especially to account for dynamic 
efficiency and how AIP payments may be used to promote it. 
 
Key words: Economics, frequencies, efficiency, spectrum pricing, spectrum management, 
Administrative Incentive pricing, AIP  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
Rapid development and increasing demand of new types of technological products and services 
utilizing radio spectrum
1
, such as smartphones and tablets using mobile services, combined with the 
scarcity of spectrum resources
2
 attest to the need of efficient frequency use. The aspiration for 
efficiency can most clearly be seen in the increased interest of telecom regulators to find new 
spectrum management methods to complement or even substitute traditional methods such as 
beauty contest and auctions in order to help ensure that frequencies are used as efficiently as 
possible. There are for example numerous studies conducted for communications regulators on 
spectrum management and pricing in particular during the last five years or so, some of which are 
also discussed in this thesis.  
 
From an economic point of view efficient use of spectrum is by no means a trivial issue; according 
to the Economist (2004), at the beginning of the 21
st
 century as much as half of the total value of 
frequencies was still wasted on uneconomic uses causing social losses to the society.  Presumably 
the situation has improved since then as efficient market-based mechanisms (especially auctions) to 
divide frequencies have become more popular, but the magnitude of significance of the issue in 
economic terms remains great. In addition to not being in their socially optimal use, some 
frequencies are not used at all or are used only a part of the time. These features have been claimed 
to be consequences of generally making spectrum a de facto private good through licensing as well 
as consequences of the lack of incentives to use spectrum efficiently. This in turn further attests to 
the importance of efficient use of spectrum. 
 
Despite the growing significance of spectrum in the society and the vast economic benefits it may 
bring when used optimally (or losses caused when used inefficiently), there have been very few new 
approaches to spectrum management during the last couple of decades. Academic research is still 
dominated by traditional division and pricing methods such as beauty contests and auctions.  This 
thesis concentrates on the new approaches describing and discussing their determination, 
                                                 
1
 Spectrum is an umbrella term which describes a band of electro-magnetic frequencies. In this thesis it specifically 
refers to radio spectrum, commonly understood to cover frequencies from approximately 10kHz to 300GHz which are 
usable for communications purposes (see e.g. Cave, Martin & Webb 2007).  
2
 There has been quite extensive discussion on whether spectrum actually is a finite and thus a scarce resource since the 
development of more efficient technologies allows higher capacity utilization (see e.g.  Staple and Werbach  2004). 
However, the mainstream view is that spectrum resources currently are limited and thus need to be regulated e.g. with 
the help of licensing. These issues are discussed in more detail in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
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development and implications for future spectrum management. The focus is specifically on 
Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP), a frequency pricing method used together with traditional 
administrative methods for dividing spectrum, which do not attach a price for the spectrum 
resources. Other new approaches, which are significant in order to provide a holistic view on 
spectrum management and to describe the possible role and significance of AIP, as well as 
traditional spectrum management methods in the future, include unlicensed spectrum and the ideas 
of abundant spectrum (as opposed to the traditional view of scarcity) and spectrum as a natural 
resource.  
 
The basic idea of AIP is to improve the efficiency of resource use by shifting spectrum from lower 
value use to higher value use. The shift is incentivized by imposing a fee on spectrum users to 
encourage them to give up under- or unused spectrum.  In other words, AIP is a cost on hoarding 
and it presupposes some form of property rights for spectrum in order for the cost to be imposed 
correctly. The most common property rights regime is the one with exclusive licenses, which is the 
primary tool for spectrum management in most countries (Doyle 2006, p. 2). While AIP imposes a 
price for spectrum the actual division of frequencies (i.e. frequency licenses) is executed through 
administrative means such as beauty contests or lotteries.  
 
Setting the AIP fee naturally requires thorough consideration as fees set too high can cause under-
utilization of the resource whereas fees that are substantially lower than the value of spectrum to the 
user(s) encourage hoarding, which in turn may cause congestion (Cave, Doyle, Webb, 2007, p.167). 
The fee is usually based on the opportunity cost of spectrum use, since it is regarded to be a clear, 
relatively easily attainable measure in line with efficient outcomes, at least under perfect 
competition assumptions. The core method, called the Smith-NERA method is based on this 
principle. However, as will be shown in chapter 4 there are also two alternative ways proposed to 
calculate the optimal AIP price; a method  by Levine and Rickman (2007) which extends the Smith-
NERA methodology to account for market structure and interference constraints, and a method 
which bases AIP payments on prices realized in market transactions. 
 
AIP should not be confused with pure cost recovery fees set to license holders. The sole purpose of 
cost recovery fees is to cover the frequency governance costs of the regulator, such as costs of 
dividing the frequencies between uses and users, whereas AIP payments are intended to reflect the 
value of the frequency and aim to incentivize its efficient use. In Europe these two frequency fees 
(termed as administrative charges and fees for rights of use) are actually required to be kept separate 
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by law (EU Authorization Directive, 2002, articles 12 and 13). Also in the U.S. the responsible 
regulator, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) separates these charges by terming them 
regulatory fees and application fees (Doyle 2007, p.1). Thus, spectrum license holders may be faced 
with two kinds of payments; cost recovery payments utilized by basically all regulators around the 
world (Cave et al. 2007, p.167) and incentive pricing fees utilized only by some regulators.  
 
Relative to alternative spectrum management methods, which currently include auctions, frequency 
trading, beauty contests, first-come-first-served methods and lotteries, AIP is a new method of 
promoting efficient use of spectrum. In its earliest forms as an “AIP like” incentive fee aimed at 
improved efficiency of spectrum use the method has been utilized in the United Kingdom since 
1998 (Ofcom) and in the New Zealand since 2009 (ACMA). In Ireland, Canada and Spain the 
regulators have applied spectrum fees exceeding the cost recovery fees, but without an explicit aim 
at doing it according to clear economic principles (ComReg, CRTC, CMT). Even though AIP is not 
currently in use in Finland the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MINTC), which is the 
authority responsible for spectrum management in Finland, has investigated this opportunity (see 
e.g. MINTC 2009). In addition, frequency assignment and pricing are current themes in Finland; the 
second auctioning of frequencies in the nation’s history (the 800MHz frequency band) was just held 
in 2013 and discussion around its successfulness has thrived in the Finnish media. 
 
Due to the novelty of the subject AIP has not been studied substantially. As was previously pointed 
out, academic research is centered around the traditional spectrum management methods and 
research around auctions is especially vast. Thus, there is a need for a concise representation of 
current literature and research around AIP and how it relates to spectrum management objectives 
and other spectrum management methods. The basic concepts and ideas go far back to the 
principles of microeconomics which have been applied to construct the framework for 
implementing AIP.  
 
The key materials on AIP discussed in this thesis include the book “Essentials of modern spectrum 
management” by Cave, Doyle and Webb (2007), the subsequent work of Doyle in “The pricing of 
radio spectrum: using incentives mechanisms to achieve efficiency” (2007) and “The need for a 
conservative approach to the pricing of radio spectrum and the renewal of radio spectrum licenses” 
(2010). In addition, reports prepared by consultants in cooperation with economics professionals for 
regulators are discussed; namely the “Study into the use of Spectrum Pricing” by the National 
Economic Research Associates Economic Consultants (NERA) and Smith System Engineering Ltd 
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(1996), “An economic study to review spectrum pricing” by Indepen Consulting Ltd, Aegis 
Systems Ltd and Warwick Business School (2004) and “Administrative Incentive Pricing for 
Radiofrequency Spectrum” by Aegis Systems Ltd and Plum Consulting Ltd (2008). These reports 
present the current way of applying the AIP, which is utilized in the U.K. and New Zealand.  Levine 
and Rickman (2007) have further developed the AIP approach from Smith-NERA (1996) and 
Indepen (2007) by constructing a more rigorous mathematical way of calculating the optimal AIP in 
their paper “Optimal Administered Incentive Pricing” which is discussed in section 4.2. 
 
As stated above, this thesis concentrates on Administrative Incentive Pricing in theory and practice. 
The thesis describes AIP and explains how it is expected to promote efficient use of spectrum 
resources. It also discusses the different situations in which AIP can and should be utilized and 
demonstrates the current methodologies used in determining AIP. In addition, the thesis discusses 
the potential role of AIP (as well as other spectrum management methods) in the future by 
introducing the issue of unlicensed spectrum and the ideas of abundant spectrum and spectrum as a 
natural resource. The thesis is mainly executed as a literature review combining theory on spectrum 
economics, opportunity cost based pricing and a practical application regarding spectrum 
management that is the AIP. The thesis presents the currently used methods of determining AIP, but 
refrains from more specific calculation of incentive prices for different spectrum band uses (mobile 
and fixed services, broadcasting etc.).  
 
An important conceptual issue regarding spectrum division is the difference between dividing 
spectrum to uses such as broadcasting or radio services and further assigning the frequencies (i.e. 
licenses) between users such as broadcasting operators and radio service providers. The former is 
often referred to as allocation and the latter as assignment of frequencies (European Commission, 
2012). Thus, allocation defines the license, i.e. the frequency band, the geographic area, the time 
period, and the restrictions on use whereas assignment defines the licensee (Cramton 2003, p. 28). 
Allocation between uses has been traditionally determined through a process of negotiations 
between national and international regulators of spectrum (see e.g. Doyle 2007 and subsection 3.1 
of the thesis) and changes in it are usually extremely slow or even unfeasible. This can be due to 
international harmonization agreements restricting the use or some technical constraints and the 
costs related to overcoming them. An example of the latter are the costs related to renewing or 
substituting equipment which has been built to operate with certain frequencies.  In other words, 
there is a dependency of infrastructure and equipment on certain technologies utilizing particular 
frequencies (and being unable to utilize others) which leads to restrictions in frequency allocation. 
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This in turn leads to inefficiencies in spectrum use when initial allocations are not optimal. 
Alternatively one can conclude that the system of allocating and assigning frequencies (through 
licensing) has lead to the current technologies being developed as opposed to what might have been 
if different kinds of allocation and assignment mechanisms, such as freely tradable spectrum rights 
or more unlicensed spectrum, had been used. As opposed to allocation between uses, the 
assignment of spectrum between different users is a process conducted and managed by the national 
authorities. It is executed with the help of various alternative spectrum management methods 
discussed in chapter 3.  
 
AIP payments can influence both assignment and allocation, since the license renounced as a result 
of the payment ends up with a new user, which may operate in a different market than the previous 
owner, i.e. have a different use for the resource. However, in practice there is likely to be much 
greater discretion over the assignment of rights in the short to medium term, as international 
agreements and technical restrictions restrict the changes in allocations. The evaluation of both 
allocative and assignment impacts is however of importance, since concentrating only on 
assignment may neglect significant opportunities to enhance efficient use of spectrum. This is easy 
to understand knowing that efficient use of spectrum resources requires allocating them to the most 
socially profitable uses; if this cannot be done due to restrictions imposed then some of the potential 
social benefits are lost.  As a matter of fact, it has even been suggested that improvements in 
allocation impose significantly larger efficiency gains than improvements in assignment (Cramton 
2003, p.28). The described definitions of allocation and assignment are followed throughout this 
thesis. 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. First the economics of radio spectrum such as demand, 
supply and efficiency determination as well as the concept of spectrum value are introduced in 
chapter 2 to build a basis for further discussion. Then alternative frequency assignment methods are 
described and compared in chapter 3, especially with respect to their fulfillment of economic 
efficiency, as it is the main objective of AIP utilization and the spectrum management in general. 
The current and suggested methods for calculating AIP are introduced and compared in chapter 4, 
again mainly in relation to the concept of economic efficiency. Chapter 5 summarizes the thesis 
findings and makes suggestions for further studies.    
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2. Economics of radio spectrum 
 
This chapter goes through the fundamental economic characteristics of radio spectrum, i.e. the part 
of the electro-magnetic frequencies which covers frequencies from approximately 10kHz to 
300GHz and can be used mainly for communications purposes. These characteristics are essential in 
understanding the ways in which radio spectrum is managed; including the motivation behind 
Administrative Incentive Pricing payments. The characteristics discussed include supply and 
demand, efficiency in the context of spectrum, as well as the concept of interference as the main 
motivation behind spectrum management. In addition, it is quite natural (and yet very rare) to draw 
parallels between spectrum and traditional natural resources (such as land, fisheries or fossil fuels) 
since the resemblance in many characteristics is evident. Thus, the viewpoint of spectrum as a 
natural resource is discussed in order to better understand the possible alternative ways of viewing 
spectrum resources. The chapter is concluded by a discussion on one of the key concepts of this 
thesis, namely spectrum value and its determinants.  
 
It is noteworthy that even these basic characteristics are not all unambiguous; they may not be 
mutually agreed upon or have not been studied extensively. A good example of a disagreement is 
viewing spectrum supply as limited, an approach changing due to technological development. 
Another example of a new approach to economics of spectrum yet to be extensively studied is the 
previously described viewpoint of spectrum as a natural resource. Since both examples can have 
significant effects on the way spectrum can and should be managed (see chapter 3 next for this 
discussion) they are also brought up in this chapter discussing the fundamental economic properties 
of spectrum.   
 
2.1 Demand 
 
Frequencies can be regarded as inputs of production; they have no intrinsic value, but their value is 
constructed through utilizing them to produce different kinds of products and services. No other 
resources are required to produce spectrum, but some factors of production such as labor and capital 
are needed to make use of it. Thus, the total demand for spectrum can be derived from the demand 
of the end products and services produced by using spectrum as an input (Indepen, Aegis and 
Warwick, 2004, p.17). These products and services are multifold and include both commercial and 
public services. Examples of the former include TV and radio broadcasting as well as mobile phone 
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services, GPS devices and wireless consumer electronics such as microwaves and automatic garage 
door openers. The latter include services of the military and other public safety promoters, the use 
of emergency frequencies being one example. In addition, radio spectrum is used to provide 
products and services utilized by both private end consumers (citizens, firms) as well as public 
entities: examples such as navigation and aviation applications are the most common ones.  
 
Frequencies differ in terms of their physical properties, which the technologies utilizing them have 
to account for.
3
 Simply put the range and penetration power are higher with lower frequencies and 
thus less infrastructure (cell sites including masts, towers and related equipment such as 
transmitters) is needed to cover a larger area. In contrast higher frequencies have a larger bandwidth 
capacity, i.e. they allow the signal to carry more data, which is why they are often utilized for 
example in the urban areas with many users. Due to the different characteristics different frequency 
bands are not equally useful for all purposes. This clearly implies that the demand for spectrum is 
not homogenous either; some frequency bands have significant excess demand while others remain 
relatively unused or specialized to certain applications. Good examples of the former are the 3G and 
4G frequencies
4
  which face a huge excess demand due to their commercial value especially for the 
telecommunications operators. The strong demand is reflected in the realized auction prices for 
these frequencies, which are throughout significantly higher than prices paid for other frequencies 
with different usages (see e.g. FCC and spectrum auctions). Examples of frequencies with a lower 
demand are frequencies of specialized usage such as the ones used for radio astronomy, which can 
utilize even the extremely high frequencies (EHF’s) at about 30-300GHz. The demand is low 
simply because the utilization of these frequencies requires special equipment and technology. 
 
The regulator can affect spectrum demand through incentive pricing, e.g. by setting AIP payments. 
The size of the effect of a price change depends naturally on the elasticity of demand of spectrum 
(marked by ϵ in the analysis in section 4.2). As spectrum is an input to production the relevant term 
to discuss is the elasticity of derived demand for spectrum. This in turn is dependent on (see 
Marshall 1920, Hicks 1932 and the Hicks-Marshall Law of Derived Demand)
5
: 
 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed description of spectrum’s physical properties see e.g. Electromagnetic waves (InTech, 2011), available 
at: http://www.intechopen.com/books/electromagnetic-waves. In addition, the key properties affecting spectrum value 
are discussed in detail in subsection 2.6.3. 
4
 3G and 4G technologies operate mainly at 700MHz-2,6GHz frequency bands, for more information see e.g. 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) at www.itu.int 
5
 Elasticity of demand of an input (i.e. elasticity of derived demand) and variables affecting it were first discussed by 
Marshall (1920) and Hicks (1963) resulting in the so called Hicks-Marshall Law of Derived Demand. The law was 
originally constructed in the context of labor demand. Here it is applied in the context of spectrum demand  
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 The price elasticity of demand for all the services and end products produced using spectrum 
as an input  
 The availability and price elasticity of supply of alternative inputs – and thus the production 
technologies available  
 Spectrum's share of total cost of production  
 
The price elasticity of demand for the services produced using spectrum as an input differs greatly 
between the services produced. The price elasticity for many commercial applications is very high 
(e.g. consider customers’ tendency to compare and switch their mobile operators), whereas the 
opposite is often true for non-commercial/public services (such as emergency services). As for 
alternative inputs for spectrum, substitutes do exist. Firstly, lack of spectrum can to some extent be 
substituted by increasing capital (i.e. building infrastructure). As an example one can think of a 
situation where a mobile communications firm lacks lower frequencies which require less 
infrastructure since their range is longer, but has a sufficient amount of higher frequencies, which 
may be as suitable for the technology utilized / service provided as the lower ones but due to their 
shorter range require more infrastructure. Thus, the lack of lower frequencies can to some extent be 
made up for by utilizing the higher frequencies by increasing capital K. In addition, as this example 
demonstrates a lack of one type of spectrum input (e.g. lower frequency bands) can be substituted 
by other frequencies (e.g. higher ones). Thus, since different frequencies are not identical, spectrum 
itself is a substitute for spectrum. The substitutability naturally depends on the technologies 
available and their suitability for different spectrum bands.   
 
Traditionally the cost of spectrum relative to total costs of production has been nonexistent, since 
spectrum has been assigned practically for free, except for the relatively small cost recovery fees 
imposed by the regulators to cover their spectrum management costs (see the next chapter 3 
discussing alternative spectrum management methods for more detailed information). 
 
The demand for spectrum is also affected by innovation: development of more efficient 
technologies may result in demand decreases as fewer spectrum resources are needed to produce the 
same amount of output. 
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2.2 Supply  
 
By nature spectrum is a common access resource since it is available to anyone. It is an intangible 
resource which, as previously mentioned, is not produced or refined from anything; it just exists as 
a part of the electromagnetic spectrum. However, in most countries practicing spectrum 
management most of the spectrum is owned by the state and leased (using licenses) under various 
terms of use. Thus, spectrum frequencies are effectively made de facto private goods through 
regulation. An exception is the so-called unlicensed spectrum, for which exclusive usage rights are 
not imposed. Unlicensed spectrum is discussed in more detail in subsection 3.5.3. 
 
Since spectrum cannot be used up (although it can in theory be in full utilization), it is also a non-
exhaustible resource. Despite its non-exhaustible nature the supply of spectrum is fixed in a sense 
that there exists a certain, finite amount of spectrum – the relevant spectrum bands under discussion 
here being radio spectrum bands, which cover frequencies from approximately 10kHz to 300GHz 
and are usable for communications purposes (Cave, Doyle & Webb 2007, p.4). However, as was 
previously discussed in relation to spectrum demand the heterogeneity (of spectrum use and thus 
demand) implies that even though the overall spectrum resources are regarded as scarce, there exist 
also spectrum bands with excess supply. 
 
In addition, the development of more efficient technologies, such as cognitive radios and ultra-
wideband
6
, enables a higher capacity utilization rate of frequencies which lessens the scarcity of 
frequencies. As Staple and Werbach (2004, p.50) state: “…the extent to which there appears to be a 
spectrum shortage largely depends not on how many frequencies are available but on the 
technologies that can be deployed”. This in turn implies that if more efficient technologies could 
develop rapidly and with relatively low costs, spectrum as a resource would evolve from scarce to 
abundant. This would have profound effects on the way spectrum could and should be managed. 
The current mainstream view however is, that spectrum resources are limited since at least for now 
technologies efficient enough to challenge this do not exist, they are too costly or complex to be 
employed commercially or can only be utilized with respect to some of the frequencies (Cave et al. 
2007, p. 11-23). This fact is significant since the idea of scarcity is key in justification of spectrum 
regulation in general and thus the use of AIP, as will be discussed next.  
                                                 
6
 Cognitive radios refer to a technology which allows radios to move across the frequency band seeking for free 
spectrum capacity which can then be utilized. Ultra-wideband in turn refers to a technology, which can be used at a low 
energy level for short-range, high-bandwidth communications using a large portion of the radio spectrum. 
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2.3 Interference, spectrum re-use and the need for regulation  
 
Scarcity of spectrum resources combined with high demand causes congestion which in turn often 
results in interference between different spectrum users. In other words, when users of limited 
spectrum resources “transmit at the same time, on the same frequency and sufficiently close to each 
other they will typically cause interference which might render both of their system unusable. Even 
if users transmit on neighboring frequencies, they can still interfere since with practical transmitters 
signals transmitted on one channel “leak” into adjacent channels, and with practical receivers 
signals in adjacent channels cannot be completely removed from the wanted signal” (Cave et al. 
2007, p.3). The first type of interference is called co-channel interference and the leakages into 
adjacent channels adjacent-channel interference. Thus, interference is a negative externality 
imposed by one user of spectrum on other users and it is driven by congestion.  
 
From the early days of spectrum management interference has been the main reason justifying the 
need for spectrum regulation by the governments and their agencies. As Melody (1980, p.393) 
summarizes: “Cooperation among all users is essential if the spectrum is to be used effectively by 
anyone.” Another important reason behind regulatory needs is that sufficient access to spectrum has 
to be ensured for applications of social or public value. Examples of these kinds of applications are 
the emergency services.  
 
A national regulator is a natural entity to execute the required supervision in coordination with other 
national regulators as well as international organs. Even though one cannot rely solely upon the 
market mechanism in achieving efficiency regulators can utilize market based mechanisms such as 
auctions or market outcome mimicking incentives such as AIP to achieve superior outcomes 
relative to alternatives such as pure administrative assignment of spectrum (Cave et. al 2007, 
p.171). The form of regulation and the regulative authorities are discussed in more detail in chapter 
3. 
 
Since frequencies differ in their demand the constraints imposed by interference are not equal for all 
parts of the radio spectrum. For frequencies with excess supply interference poses no problem 
whereas for high demand (the most valuable) frequencies careful management is needed to ensure 
that as many users as possible are able to utilize the resource without unnecessary interference. One 
way of accounting for the differing interference constraints when defining the AIP payments is by 
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combining basic graph theory with economic theory as will be shown in subsection 4.2 along with 
the optimal AIP calculations by Levin and Rickman (2007).  
 
Interference requires the use of different frequencies for some communications, but the possibility 
of sharing frequencies exists for others. Frequency reuse means using the same radio frequencies on 
radio transmitter sites within a geographic area, provided that they are separated by sufficient 
distance in order to minimize interference (Althos - GSM tutorial). In other words, to avoid harmful 
interference adjacent areas (sometimes called cells) use different frequencies, but geographic areas 
which are sufficiently far away from each other may use the same spectrum resources. In practice 
this is seen for example in the fact that in different countries the same frequencies are (re-)used; e.g. 
operators in Finland and Sweden may both use the same frequencies to provide mobile services. 
 
2.4 Efficiency and spectrum 
 
The key purpose of spectrum management is to maximize the value of frequency use to society by 
encouraging efficient use of spectrum and thus allowing as many efficient users as possible while 
also ensuring manageable interference between users (Cave et al. 2007, p.3).  In order to create 
spectrum management tools to try to fulfill this objective one must have a clear understanding on 
what is meant by efficiency in spectrum policy. This in turn is not as unambiguous as one might 
think; various practices in determining efficiency in spectrum policy exist (concepts such as 
allocative, productive, technical, dynamic and functional efficiency are often mentioned) and they 
are not always correctly understood by regulators designing the policy tools. In some cases, these 
efficiency measures can even be conflicted and achieving one does not guarantee that other 
efficiency indicators are successfully fulfilled. An example of this kind of a situation is an auction 
which manages to allocate spectrum to the bidders who value them the most and can use them most 
efficiently in the long term. Still, in the short term these acquired resources may be left fallow, 
which indicates that even though the so called allocative efficiency (see the definition below) is 
fulfilled, technical efficiency requiring constant full utilization of the resource is left unfulfilled (for 
a more detailed discussion see e.g. Freyens & Yerokhin, 2011).  
 
In general efficiency is concerned with the society utilizing scarce resources such as spectrum in 
order to satisfy differing needs of various agents, which include for example consumers, firms and 
the regulator as a social planner. To be more specific, this thesis follows the approach given by 
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Indepen et al. (2004) and followed by Cave et al. (2007) as well as Doyle (2007), which suggests 
that efficiency in the context of spectrum management should be understood as economic 
efficiency. Economic efficiency accounts for both static (efficiency existing at a point in time) and 
dynamic efficiency (efficiency over time) by having three dimensions: Allocative, productive and 
dynamic efficiency.  
 
Allocative efficiency has to do with the economy producing the most desired types of goods and 
services in a way that Pareto optimality is satisfied (Indepen et al. p.20). In other words, spectrum 
should be allocated across different uses in a way that the mix of goods and services produced is 
optimal; no other mix can increase the well-being of one economic agent without harming the well-
being of another agent
7
. Allocative efficiency can thus be improved by encouraging the utilization 
of spectrum as an input in the production of products and services most valued by the consumers.  
 
Productive efficiency refers to producing the goods and services at the lowest possible cost where 
cost is measured in terms of inputs such as capital, labor and spectrum (Doyle 2007, p.2). Thus, 
being productively efficient implies producing on the production possibility frontier. As productive 
efficiency requires that no inputs are “wasted” it is closely related to technical efficiency, a concept 
frequently emphasized in spectrum management. Technical efficiency is concerned about the 
utilization rate of spectrum, i.e. that the maximum output is produced with a minimal amount of 
inputs, and it is often seen as an integral part of productive efficiency (see e.g. Doyle 2007). It is 
important to note the additive nature of the different efficiency measures. For example technical 
efficiency is a part of the overall economic efficiency, but it can as well occur while the overall 
economic efficiency is left unfulfilled: the spectrum resources may be fully utilized, but by non-
optimal users. 
 
Dynamic efficiency in turn refers to frequencies being allocated and used in a way that encourages 
(an optimal amount of) innovation and R&D (Cave et al. p.170). It can also be interpreted as 
allocating the inputs to production over time in a way which maintains productive and allocative 
efficiency in response to changes in technology and consumer preferences (Ofcom, 2006, p.54). 
Thus, through dynamic efficiency it is possible to further improve efficiency over time; for example 
by investing in the development of new technologies a spectrum (license) owner can increase the 
                                                 
7
 It is noteworthy that a Pareto efficient solution is not necessarily socially optimal; there may be a way to increase one 
economic agent's welfare more than another agent's welfare decreases which increases social welfare.  
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utilization rate of frequency and in economic terms shift his/her production possibilities frontier 
outwards producing more with the same resources. 
 
When all the conditions necessary for economic efficiency are achieved, the economy satisfies the 
requirements of perfect competition thus enabling the attainment of socially optimal solutions as 
well. Markets utilizing spectrum naturally do not satisfy these strict requirements: there exist 
externalities, the most important of which is the interference discussed above. The consequent need 
for regulation as well as various transactional, administrative as well as political constraints restrict 
the flexibility to allocate and assign spectrum to the most socially valuable users and uses. Thus, the 
regulators must compromise between different objectives while accounting for interference. These 
issues are discussed in more detail in chapter 3 in connection with spectrum management and its 
methods. 
 
2.5 Natural resource properties of spectrum 
 
Spectrum as a resource with significant value to the society and established need for regulation is in 
many fundamental ways similar to the traditional natural resources such as land, forests or fossil 
fuels. Actually, many governmental actors as well as researchers seem to be agreeing on the issue 
that spectrum is, at least to some extent, a natural resource, but have yet to fulfill their implicit 
promise to treat it as such (Ryan 2005). This subchapter shortly discusses the connection between 
natural and spectrum resources. The issue is of relevance, since it may have impacts on AIP’s (as 
well as other current pricing and assignment methods’) use and validity in the future. On one hand, 
relating spectrum to natural resources might mean that current economic models for spectrum 
regulation must be adapted to accommodate the special features of natural resources. On the other 
hand, this might open up new possibilities of regulating and pricing spectrum.  
 
Spectrum possesses a variety of features that have traditionally been regarded as properties of 
natural resources. It is similar to air or sunshine in a sense that they are all ubiquitous, i.e. can be 
found and exist everywhere. In principle spectrum is also non-excludable and non-exhaustible (even 
though it can be fully utilized). The scarcity and possibilities for externalities have however resulted 
in a situation where spectrum has become a common property resource, collectively managed by 
governments (nationally and through international cooperation) and leased under various terms; 
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much in the way in which for example land tenures function. Another way in which spectrum 
resources resemble land resources is the heterogeneous nature of both.  
 
However, spectrum resources also differ from natural resources in some elementary ways. In 
addition to being non-exhaustible, spectrum resources are also instantly renewable; whenever a 
certain application stops using a frequency the same frequency becomes usable for any other 
application. In any case an interesting question arises: what could we learn from all the existing 
research and policies applied to natural resources? 
 
2.6 Spectrum value 
 
Considerations of spectrum value are essential to administrative pricing decisions, since the basic 
idea of AIP is to encourage efficient use of spectrum resources through a fee which reflects the 
value of spectrum in its optimal, feasible use. This fee then gives spectrum users incentives to re-
consider their current use and need of spectrum. As a result spectrum resources can be re-allocated 
or re-assigned from lower value use to higher value use implying better overall efficiency.  
 
However, the problem a regulator faces while reflecting on spectrum pricing is the complex nature 
of spectrum value. This is well explained by ITU (2012, p.1) which states that the building blocks 
of spectrum value are as much political and socioeconomic as they are purely financial. Financial 
value refers to the value derived through market sales of spectrum (e.g. auctions), which actually 
reflects the private value of spectrum to its users, i.e. what they are willing to pay for the resource. 
Due to market imperfections this is usually not consistent with the value of spectrum to the society 
(or social value), which also accounts for an array of objectives of the regulator (the social planner), 
such as market structure (see section 3.1 for a detailed description of spectrum management 
objectives). These objectives may not always be commercially viable, but are seen as socially 
preferable; such as the rollout of services into rural areas. Valuing spectrum also raises the question 
of whether frequencies used to produce public services such as defense and emergency services 
should be priced and thus be subject to AIP in the first place.  
 
This section 2.6 discusses the possible inconsistency between private and social value of spectrum 
along with key spectrum drivers. Since spectrum prices reflect (private) spectrum value and are in a 
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market environment determined by demand and supply this section is strongly linked to those of 
demand (2.1) and supply (2.2.). Thus all previous discussion naturally applies here.  
2.6.1 Private value  
 
It seems plausible that a rational firm values access to spectrum, or in the presence of a license 
regime the license, based on expected (discounted) future returns provided by the access. Aegis and 
Plum (2008) offer a useful framework to examine private spectrum value for the spectrum utilizing 
firms. According to them the total spectrum value (TV) for the firms consists of two elements: the 
expected net present value of future returns (NPV) and the option value (OV). The expected net 
present value of returns include returns from spectrum use i.e. from enhancement of existing 
services or creation of new ones (termed as the project based value, PV) and defensive or strategic 
value (DV) from gaining additional profits by utilizing some level of market power. The defensive 
value is thus concerned with acquiring spectrum resources to protect ones market share e.g. by 
restricting entry of new players or raising competitors’ costs. Defensive value is assumed to be 
nonnegative based on the presence of imperfections in the market.  
 
The concept of option value becomes relevant when there exists significant uncertainty over future 
applications and their value and there are sunk or irreversible costs associated with investments 
(Aegis & Plum 2008, p.9). It refers to the value of flexibility spectrum offers even if left partly or 
totally unutilized; it offers the spectrum (license) holder better abilities to respond to changing 
circumstances by keeping the spectrum “on hold”. Positive option values would imply clearly 
positive prices even for spectrum resources for which there exists excess supply. The determination 
of spectrum value as defined by Aegis and Plum (2008) can be summarized as: 
 
TV = PV + DV + OV, where DV, OV ≥ 0 and PV + DV = NPV of returns (1) 
 
However, the application of regulatory control as well as the competition law implies that at least in 
theory the significance of defensive value should be small and it can be largely ignored when 
assessing spectrum values. In addition, spectrum licenses often carry with them different kinds of 
coverage and rollout conditions, or even straightforward “use it or lose it” –type of terms. This in 
turn implies that the spectrum license owner rarely gets to keep the acquired spectrum unutilized. 
Thus, the role of option value is also assumed to be quite insignificant. So, the main component of 
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spectrum value from the users’ point of view is thus the spectrum’s ability to generate 
revenues/profit for the firm. 
 
The current methods of determining AIP payments are mainly based on the idea of the opportunity 
cost of spectrum use (see chapter 4 for more details) and thus reflect the private value of spectrum. 
The same is true for spectrum resources that are auctioned (or traded in secondary markets), since 
the bidders in the auction naturally bid according to their own private valuations of the spectrum 
resource. This emphasis of private value may however differ from the value of spectrum to society, 
especially when the markets are not perfect. The social value aspect is discussed next. 
2.6.2 Social value 
 
According to basic economic theory, in the absence of externalities the private optimum level of 
production equals the social optimum. Thus, in such a market the social value of spectrum equals 
private value, i.e. the valuation of the most efficient firm. This valuation in the absence of market 
distortions was depicted in the previous subsection by the gains from enhancement of existing 
services or creation of new ones, i.e. the project based value (PV). As was already acknowledged 
however, in the market for spectrum the externality of interference exists implying that social and 
private valuations of spectrum differ.  
 
Furthermore, if the firm acquires significant market power upon obtaining the license, social and 
private values diverge (McMillan 1995, p.193). Obtaining market power would be indicated by a 
positive defensive value parameter (DV) in the previous subsection 2.6.1. This also seems to often 
be the case for spectrum resources since the current license assignment methods have in many 
countries led to highly concentrated market structures (Milgrom, Levin & Eilat 2011, p.12). 
Therefore, the optimality of using private valuation information as a basis of pricing spectrum is 
further challenged. However, private spectrum valuations may be the only feasible valuations 
available or at least most easily attainable, since e.g. information on realized auction prices is 
available. In addition, they may be close enough to the optimum given that the distortions (such as 
externalities and market power impacts) are relatively small. Aegis and Indepen (2005, p.5)
8
 also 
acknowledge that opportunity cost estimates used as a basis for AIP fees may not need to be 
adjusted to account for the social value, because the opportunity cost estimates are calculated in the 
presence of policies, such as coverage requirements, that are designed to promote the social aspects.  
                                                 
8
 This article focuses specifically on pricing frequencies that are used to provide broadcasting services, but the same 
conclusion can be drawn for all spectrum resources  
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Thus, in addition to taking into account the gains from enhancement of existing services or creation 
of new ones social value includes considerations about factors such as market structure and 
investment regulation – for example ensuring investments and thus the existence of services in rural 
areas. The mechanisms used to calculate AIP payments, introduced in chapter 4, differ with respect 
to their considerations on private versus social value. 
2.6.3 Key value drivers  
 
Valuation differences between spectrum bands result from various spectrum properties, physical as 
well as other, a part of which were already discussed in subchapter 2.1. Trying to provide a 
complete description of the properties would be an onerous task providing very little benefit for the 
further analysis. However, it is useful to identify the key value drivers in order to be able to discuss 
the AIP payment formation and justification in the forthcoming chapters. For this purpose a 
classification of the key value drivers is formed based on Smith & NERA (1996) and Aegis and 
Plum (2008).  
 
While considering the value of a certain spectrum asset, the following aspects should be taken into 
account: 
 
A. Frequency amount 
o Bandwidth 
o Area sterilized 
B. Frequency properties  
o Propagation characteristics 
o Location of use – e.g. urban vs. rural 
o Possible international harmonization  
C. Existence of alternatives 
o Utilization possibilities for different applications  
o Re-use opportunities (frequency sharing) 
o Congestion level 
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D. Other qualitative factors 
o Convenience of use 
o Ease of equipment availability 
o Maintenance or quality of transmissions 
 
From the point of view of AIP, which is most often determined based on opportunity cost, the 
especially interesting aspects relate to the existence of alternatives (point C above). Naturally the 
more applications can use the band the more demand there is and thus the value of the spectrum 
band is increased. The same value increase through demand explains why congested bands are more 
valuable than uncongested ones. Possibilities for frequency sharing naturally reduce congestion and 
thus can be expected to have an opposite effect on the value of the frequency.  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the fundamental economic characteristics of spectrum thus building a basis for 
further discussion of spectrum allocation, assignment and pricing as well as the motivation behind 
applying AIP.  As spectrum is an input of production its demand was shown to be derived from the 
demand of the end products and services produced using frequencies. The heterogeneity of demand 
was also justified and main reasons behind varying demands across different spectrum bands were 
explained to be caused by the heterogeneous nature and the vast amount of different applications for 
spectrum resources. The scarcity of spectrum supply was shown to be a controversial issue; 
however the current understanding being that the supply is limited. The concept of interference was 
established as the main motivation for spectrum management and efficiency in the spectrum context 
was defined as economic efficiency, which was shown to include the concepts of allocative, 
productive and dynamic efficiency. As a curiosity spectrum was paralleled with natural resources, 
since they are similar in many ways and this approach may arouse new ways of managing and 
pricing spectrum. Finally, one key element of AIP, spectrum value was discussed from the private 
and social point of views. Private spectrum value was broken down into project and defensive 
values (forming the total returns from spectrum usage) and the option value. It was also shown that 
this private value is likely to divert from the social value of spectrum whenever market distortions 
are present. Finally, the key value drivers were identified as the amount of frequency (bandwidth), 
its key properties (propagation characteristics, location of use and harmonization), the existence of 
alternative uses and possibilities for sharing. 
 
Next the different spectrum management practices, i.e. alternative ways of assigning and pricing 
frequencies, are introduced and compared. The comparisons are made especially with respect to the 
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fulfillment of economic efficiency. The main objective of chapter 3 is to give the reader a thorough 
understanding on alternatives for the AIP method and advantages as well as downsides of AIP 
relative to other spectrum management methods. 
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3. Spectrum management – description and comparison of the 
alternative methods 
 
This chapter offers a description of spectrum management, its objectives as well as key methods.  
The different methods are also compared with respect to the attainment of the objectives of the 
regulator (“social planner”) and especially relative to economic efficiency (i.e. allocative, 
productive and dynamic efficiency), since that is the main goal to be fulfilled by the use of AIP. The 
main focus is naturally on AIP and the comparisons are made in orders to understand when and why 
AIP is preferred as a pricing method relative to other alternatives and how it is used to complement 
alternative spectrum management methods.  
 
3.1 Spectrum management and its objectives 
 
The main objective of spectrum management is naturally to ensure that the value to the society from 
scarce spectrum resources is maximized. This is done by allowing as many efficient users as 
possible while keeping interference at an acceptable level. To fulfill this task spectrum is allocated 
to different uses and further assigned to users.  
 
As was discussed in 2.3 the need for regulation is justified by the existence of interference. Due to 
the fact that interference can extend beyond national geographical boundaries and since there exists 
also inherently international uses of spectrum, such as aviation, spectrum management needs to 
operate at international as well as national level (Cave et al. 2007, p.5). The figure 1 below, 
constructed based on Cave et al. (2007) illustrates the international spectrum management 
framework. The examples given for each level of regulation (light blue boxes) consist of the ones 
discussed in this thesis and are not meant to be exhaustive. 
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Figure 1. The spectrum management framework 
 
 
 
Source: Cave et al. 2007 (modified) 
 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is an agency of the United Nations responsible 
for information and communication technologies (ITU 2012). It accounts for the highest level of 
spectrum management allocating the global radio spectrum to different uses, which vary from 
prescriptive, such as satellite, to uses allowing significant interpretation and variation, such as fixed 
or mobile (Cave et al. 2007, p.5). Under ITU there are the multi-national bodies further 
coordinating and harmonizing spectrum management across regions, such as the European Union 
(EU) and Confederation of European Post and Telecommunication Agencies (CEPT). National 
regulators, such as the Ministry of Transport and Communications in Finland (MINTC) then 
operate within the guidelines provided by the international regulating bodies. It is important to note 
that the guidelines provided are non-binding, but deviations by individual countries are expected not 
to cause interference on other countries (Cave et al. 2007, p.6). 
 
Since the use of a certain frequency band is often defined through international coordination and 
harmonization in the way described above (although the allocation might not be binding as such) 
the national regulator’s ability to allocate spectrum to different uses is restricted. Thus, spectrum 
management at the national level is usually concerned with assignment decisions within predefined 
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uses rather than allocation between uses. However, the assignment methods introduced can be 
applied also to allocation of spectrum, where the national regulator assesses the possible benefits of 
different uses and allocates spectrum accordingly possibly deviating from the international 
guidelines. Consequently the spectrum management methods presented in this chapter are often 
referred to as allocation methods as opposed to assignment methods.  
 
As was previously stated, in most countries the primary tool for spectrum management is a 
licensing system, which is a form of property rights. A spectrum license gives its holder an 
exclusive right to transmit at a given frequency. License conditions, which define the contents of 
the property right, i.e. what the license entitles the license holder to do and on the other hand what 
the holder is required to do, are multifold. They can for example be defined to restrict the particular 
technology that can be used such as GSM, or a particular use, such as mobile (Cave et al. 2007, 
p.105). However, many regulators nowadays express willingness to grant more service and 
technology neutral licenses imposing fewer restrictions on the use of spectrum (see e.g. Ministry of 
Transport and Communications in Finland 2012). Naturally this kind of deregulation can be claimed 
to increase economic efficiency through allowing spectrum to be used to produce the services most 
valued in the society (increasing allocative efficiency) with a technology that is regarded the most 
effective (increasing technical and thus productive efficiency). It also allows for experimenting with 
new technologies which may increase the dynamic efficiency through innovation. Thus, in theory 
the license conditions should be as unrestricted as possible implying that the national regulators 
would also be in charge of allocation of spectrum in addition to its assignment between users.  Yet 
in practice the problem which arises is again the scarcity imposed interference; the more non-
harmonized the usage terms the more likely interference is to occur between users. In other words, 
the existence of externalities (i.e. interference) requires deviations from socially optimal solutions. 
 
As the social planner the regulator has a set of objectives to fulfill in order to maximize the 
spectrum’s value to the society. The main goals of the regulator usually include the following (ITU 
2012): 
 Efficient usage and assignment of the spectrum resources 
 Rapid and effective introduction of a new wireless technology (i.e. broadband wireless 
access or BWA) 
 Reduction of the digital divide, through the development of wireless service in remote, rural 
or generally low population density areas 
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 Protection or promotion of social welfare and/or public service 
 Minimization of potential interference and coexistence issues 
 Government revenue generation 
 
Some of the objectives, such as efficient usage of spectrum resources and promotion of social 
welfare are clearly complementary goals both increasing overall welfare. Instead goals such as 
increasing rural rollout do not necessarily increase the overall social welfare but are however 
imposed and desirable due to equity reasons. This is true for the rollout objective since such 
investments are costly with little revenue gained, and thus not economically viable for firms to 
make. The social losses made by heavy investments are unlikely to be recompensed by the increase 
in consumer surplus since very few customers are located in these sparsely populated rural areas. 
This example illustrates the contradicted nature of some of the objectives of the regulator and 
emphasizes the need for prioritization. 
 
3.2 Spectrum management methods 
 
As for the assignment and/or pricing methods by which key spectrum management objectives can 
be reached, regulators have three sets of methods in their use. Firstly there are traditional 
administrative methods, which do not include any marked-based processes but are, as their name 
suggests, purely administrative giving the regulator a lot of power over the assignment or pricing of 
the spectrum resources. These methods include lotteries, first-come-first-serve methods and beauty 
contests. Secondly, regulators may use market-based methods, which include auctions and 
secondary markets for spectrum, i.e. spectrum trading. These methods impose fewer information 
requirements for the regulators, since the regulators do not have to administratively set the price, 
but it is set by a market process. However, even the use of these methods requires careful planning 
of the framework to ensure optimal outcomes: aspects to consider include the terms with which 
participants are allowed to participate (e.g. financial credibility), possible bidding limitations (e.g. 
bidding caps) as well as the technical execution of the process (e.g. programs used). Thirdly, the 
regulators have in their use a set of newer pricing and assignment methods, which are here termed 
as “new methods”. There have not been many new approaches introduced into spectrum 
management during the last few decades, but the three most significant ones, AIP (combined with 
administrative methods), the viewpoint of frequencies as natural resources and the special case of 
unlicensed spectrum are discussed under the title “new methods”. Figure 2 summarizes the 
available spectrum management methods. 
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Source: Modified from various spectrum regulator sources (ITU, Ofcom, MINTC, FCC) 
 
When different assignment/pricing methods are compared, the essential setting which the regulator 
faces is that of the principal-agent setting familiar from economic theory.  The task of spectrum 
assignment and pricing can be thus thought of as a “principal-agent” type of game between the 
regulator (“principal”) and the users of spectrum (“agents”). The problem the regulator faces while 
deciding the optimal mechanism for dividing frequencies as well as governing their use is that of 
asymmetric information. The task would be easy if the regulator possessed sufficient information 
about the individual valuation (and thus the cost structures as well as technological solutions 
available) that spectrum users have for spectrum. In that case the choice of the assignment method 
would be insignificant, since the regulator would always be able to offer Pareto efficient solutions, 
i.e. optimal prices for the different spectrum licenses.  In the real world however, the problem of 
adverse selection exists as the regulator is imperfectly informed about the characteristics of the 
spectrum users. The existence of this problem makes the different allocation methods unequal from 
the economic efficiency point of view or at least imposes many requirements on the information the 
regulator should have in order to price spectrum administratively in a way that promotes efficiency.  
 
Market-based mechanisms which are designed to reveal the valuation without the regulator needing 
to determine it “based on an enlightened guess” are preferred in this respect. However, there may be 
other reasons related to e.g. political pressure or some social value such as equity which favor the 
use of administrative methods. The AIP in turn is a method “in the middle” in a sense that it is 
combined with administrative methods to incorporate market-based incentives to them. The 
alternative methods as well as benefits and weaknesses of each alternative are discussed next so that 
each of the alternative approaches constitutes its own subchapter.  The main focus is on the 
attainment of economic efficiency, i.e. how well the alternative methods satisfy allocative, 
Figure 2. Spectrum  management methods 
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productive and dynamic efficiency goals. This is due to the reason that achieving economic 
efficiency is the main goal of AIP utilization (see e.g. Ofcom 2010). 
 
3.3 Traditional administrative methods  
 
First we concentrate on the traditional assignment methods, which as such impose no price on 
frequencies (although it is common for the regulators to impose small cost recovery fees), but can 
be combined with pricing schemes such as the AIP. These include lotteries, first-come-first-serve 
methods and beauty contests, sometimes also called hearings. Administrative licensing methods, 
especially beauty contests, are still widely used even though market-based mechanisms have 
increased their popularity during the last couple of decades.  
3.3.1 Lotteries 
 
Lotteries are random selection processes whereby the licensees are selected by chance. Due to their 
obvious lack of any kind of systematic aspiration towards economic efficiency, or for any of the 
other key objectives of spectrum management depicted in 3.1, they are nowadays rarely used in 
spectrum management (FCC 2012). The key motivation behind their use, mainly in the 1980’s, was 
that they succeeded in assigning the licenses quickly. However, as demand started to grow, this 
became evermore challenging. An illustrative example of this is the appliance of lotteries in the 
U.S. in 1982, when beauty contest awards lacked severely behind causing costs to the applicants, 
the government and ultimately to the public as forgone services (McMillan 1994, p.4). 
Consequently the government tried replacing the beauty contests with lotteries, but the prospect of 
windfall gains attracted nearly 400 000 applications, some of which were submitted by users not 
being technically competent to develop and operate the subsequent spectrum utilizing services. 
3.3.2 First-come-first-serve approach 
 
The first-come-first-serve (FCFS) approach, according to its name, is an administrative decision 
assigning the license(s) to the first credible applicant(s). It is typically used for low-valued 
frequencies with weak demand, since for those frequencies there will be no necessity to resolve 
mutually exclusive or competing requests (ITU 2010, p.17). The FCFS method was especially 
popular before the 21
st
 century as there was enough spectrum in almost every band to accommodate 
most or all users and permit adequate separation among potentially incompatible uses (Neto & 
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Wellenius, 2005, p.2). An example of frequencies assigned using the FCFS method are link 
frequencies in Finland. 
 
The credibility of applicants requires that in order to be granted the license the applicant must 
adhere to certain technical standards and regulations. This aspiration towards selecting a credible 
applicant is what essentially separates the FCFS method from lotteries implying slightly more 
efficient assignments of the resource. However, savings in administrative costs of 
allocation/assignment relative to more complex management methods seems to be the only 
significant benefit the FCFS method offers. In addition, this benefit is likely to be revoked by the 
probability of not assigning spectrum to the user valuing it the most, i.e. the probability that the 
most efficient user of the resource is not the quickest to respond to the offer. 
3.3.3 Beauty contests  
 
In a beauty contest the awarding authority (regulator) releases an invitation to bid for the spectrum 
licenses in question. The invitation contains a set of criteria, such as population to be served (i.e. 
coverage), speed of deployment, project viability, spectrum efficiency and ability to stimulate 
competition, based on which responses are evaluated. The selection criteria can be weighted 
depending on the objectives of the regulator. After the responses to the invitation have been 
submitted the awarding authority judges the quality of applicants’ responses against the criteria and 
assigns spectrum licenses accordingly. (Ofcom 2012, FCC 2012) Since a beauty contest includes 
actually assessing the benefits the applicants would bring to society instead of assignment based on 
draws or FCFS principles it is the most interesting administrative spectrum management method as 
far as economic efficiency is concerned. 
 
Beauty contests are still widely used, processes well established and understood by the regulators 
(tenderers) as well as the applicants. For example in Finland, licenses even to the most valuable 
radio frequencies have traditionally been assigned using beauty contests. Market based mechanisms 
were first tried as the 2,6GHz licenses were auctioned to mobile communications operators in 2009. 
The second frequency auction, for one of the most valued spectrum bands in the 800MHz area is 
scheduled to be held during 2013 (MINTC 2012).  
 
The main issues with beauty contests relate to the low benefit-cost ratio: such comparative 
processes can be very time-consuming and resource-intensive (especially related to more 
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straightforward traditional methods) and yet not able to assign spectrum to the agents valuing them 
the most, thus leading to non-optimal solutions from the efficiency point of view. Administrative 
decisions and their impartiality are easy to call into question and whereas the regulator may be able 
promote national/societal goals more easily through tendering terms, comparative processes are in 
practice often decided on the basis of minor differences among applicants (ITU 2010, p.18). The 
award usually favors established companies (e.g. incumbents), since they are able to cite a track 
record to support their case (Ofcom 2012), which may impair dynamic efficiency by restricting the 
market entry of innovative, new companies.  
 
In general, as the traditional administrative methods do not impose any price on frequencies, the 
issue of economic rents or windfall profits arises.  In addition, users of spectrum have few incentives 
to give up underused spectrum or on the other hand invest in spectrally efficient technologies or 
services.  Next we will move from discussing pure administrative methods to market-based 
methods, which address and correct some of these issues. 
 
3.4 Market-based methods 
 
Instead of relying on a regulator to perform spectrum allocation or assignment, market-based 
methods are based on the assumption that market mechanisms, while properly monitored and 
supported, are the most effective way of complementing the task. Market-based assignment 
methods include auctions and spectrum trading or a secondary market for spectrum licenses. 
3.4.1 Auctions 
 
Auctions represent a market based pricing and assignment
9
 mechanism whereby the price and the 
licensee of the frequency are determined in a bidding process. Aside from pre-determined 
requirements and conditions for the tendering process, only price matters. The idea of auctioning 
airwaves rather than assigning them through administrative licensing methods was first proposed by 
Leo Herzel in his 1951 article “'Public Interest' and the Market in Color Television Regulation.” 
followed by Ronald Coase in his 1959 article “The Federal Communications Commission”.  
However, it took approximately forty years before the administrative licensing methods described 
previously started to be replaced by market based pricing of frequencies. New Zealand was the first 
                                                 
9
 As was discussed previously, the methods discussed may in theory also be used to allocate spectrum between uses, but 
in practice this is very rare 
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country in the world to legislate spectrum auctions in 1989 and it also executed the first auction 
only a year later in 1990 (McMillan, 1994, p.147-148). Another pioneer has been the United States 
which held its first spectrum auction in 1994 and has since executed nearly a hundred auctions 
(FCC, 2012). In Europe the first auctions were held at the beginning of the 21
st
 century as 3G 
licenses were assigned. Currently auctions are the dominant assignment method for spectrum and 
they are carried out especially when there exists strong competition for scarce spectrum with a high 
commercial value (Milgrom et al., 2011, p. 22). 
 
Spectrum auctions are generally considered to be the most efficient spectrum management tools in 
achieving allocative efficiency. This is due to the fact that in a competitive bidding situation where 
only the price paid matters (in determining the winner(s)), the licenses are obtained by those who 
value them the most and are thus best equipped to utilize them effectively. This naturally 
presupposes that the firms are unbiased in their estimation of the future profits generated by the use 
of the resource, i.e. in determining the total value (TV) as described previously in 2.6.1. 
 
The framework of value creation is also useful for identifying the key issues and possible 
shortcomings of auctions as a spectrum management method. As private firms evaluate the value of 
spectrum resources not only based on returns on spectrum use, but also based on the possible 
defensive or strategic value (termed as DV in 2.6.1) the spectrum resource entails, an auction could 
end up in a situation where a firm would be willing to bid on spectrum just to interfere with 
competitors. This also illustrates the problematic relationship between private and social value and 
the fact that these two often do not meet. Regulators have however in their disposal measures to 
prevent such a situation from arising. Auction conditions such as “use it or lose it” are examples of 
this. In addition, anti-competitive outcomes such as large operators acquiring an undue 
concentration of the available spectrum can be restricted by limiting the amount of spectrum one 
applicant may bid on (i.e. establishing bidding caps).  
 
Another key pitfall related to auctions is the phenomenon of winner’s curse. When there is 
incomplete information, the winner of the tender process tends to overvalue the resource tendered 
and thus overpay (for empirical proof see e.g. Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003). This in turn may lead to 
lower investment level and thus hinder development and efficiency especially from the point of 
view of dynamic efficiency.  
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Even though auctions are considered the preferred assignment method to ensure initial efficient 
distribution of the spectrum, the question related to dynamic efficiency remains; how to ensure that 
spectrum continues to be used in an economically efficient manner in the future?  As with other 
resources, economists recommend that spectrum users be allowed to transfer their spectrum rights 
(ITU 2010, p.18). The emergence of secondary markets for spectrum will be discussed next in 
subchapter 3.4.2. 
3.4.2 Trading – secondary markets 
 
In order to ensure that spectrum resources continue to be used efficiently, secondary markets may 
be needed. The core idea is very simple and equivalent to that of the basic principle of AIP 
payments: moving spectrum from lower-value to higher-value uses and users until the value of any 
marginal unit of bandwidth is equal for all, or until the cost of spectrum to any buyer equals its 
value to some next-best user.  
 
The main constraint for creating any form of free trading in spectrum is the externality of 
interference. Most adversaries of free trade state that preventing interference among technically 
different services would require extremely complex engineering analysis and could lead to litigation 
among spectrum users. Other counterarguments include for example not satisfying socially 
desirable requirements and not being able to restrict anti-competitive outcomes.  (ITU 2010, p. 17). 
 
A totally free market spectrum approach has not been implemented by any country (ITU 2012, p. 
32). However, spectrum trading is to some extent allowed in Australia, Guatemala, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom (Doyle 2006, p.1).  
 
Administrative Incentive Payments can be thought of as a gradual step towards trading frequencies 
as they enable and encourage users to give up frequencies that are either not utilized or are of more 
value to someone else. AIP will be discussed in short in the next subchapter (3.5.1) under “new 
approaches” for spectrum management as well as more extensively during the rest of this thesis 
(chapters 4-5). 
 
All in all, market based mechanisms are preferred over pure administrative ones whenever there 
exists a sufficient amount of actors in the market (i.e. demand exceeds supply) and there is genuine 
competition between the players. 
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3.5 New approaches 
 
As was stated at the beginning of this thesis there have been very few new ways of thinking about 
spectrum resources, their management and pricing during the last couple of decades. The most 
significant ones, discussed in this subchapter, include the Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP), 
spectrum as a natural resource and the concept of unlicensed spectrum. All of these methods pursue 
to either find fundamental ways of treating and regulating spectrum differently than before 
(spectrum as a natural resource and unlicensed spectrum) or to complement more traditional 
methods in order to enhance efficiency of the resource use (AIP). 
3.5.1 The Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP) approach   
 
As was previously explained, Administrative Incentive Pricing is a frequency pricing method, 
utilization of which presupposes some form of property rights in order to impose a fee on spectrum 
usage. Most commonly the property right regime consists of licenses offering exclusive usage rights 
to spectrum for a specified time and possibly with other usage requirements (e.g. regarding 
coverage). AIP is combined with the traditional administrative assignment methods, which 
themselves impose no explicit price for spectrum, to better mimic the market based outcomes. Thus, 
the AIP approach is not an assignment method, but a pricing method combined with administrative 
assignment methods.  
 
AIP aims at imposing a market price for frequencies, which encourage spectrum users to give up 
spectrum that is either unused or otherwise valued less than the charged AIP payment. If AIP truly 
reflects the highest market valuation or highest value of alternative use, this encourages the 
transference of spectrum resources to agents valuing them the most.  
 
The use of incentive pricing of spectrum as opposed to or as a complement for the pure 
administrative allocation and assignment methods was first proposed by Levin as early as 1970 in 
his paper “Spectrum allocation without market”. Levin’s approach to spectrum management 
envisaged an incremental path towards efficient pricing, with revealed and stated preference 
methods being used to reveal opportunity costs. Another economist promoting the issue was 
Melody who (1980, p.396) identified the substantial possibilities for economic rents or windfall 
profits to be gained by the firms utilizing spectrum with the contemporary spectrum management 
mechanisms.  
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AIP or an AIP like pricing (i.e. prices clearly above pure administrative fees) for frequencies is 
currently utilized in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland, Canada and Spain. In addition, its 
application has been considered in Finland. Many of the current applications are however still 
implemented without an explicit aim at doing it according to clear economic principles (ComReg, 
CRTC).  The telecom regulator in the UK, Ofcom, defines the role of AIP as follows: “AIP should 
continue to be used in combination with other spectrum management tools, in both the commercial 
and the public sectors, with the objective of securing optimal use of the radio spectrum in the long 
term. AIP’s role in securing optimal use is in providing long-term signals of the value of spectrum” 
(Ofcom 2010). 
 
Instead of lump sum payments (think of auction payments), AIP payments are charged as an annual 
fee from the spectrum licensees. Theoretically the sum of the net present values of AIP payments 
should be equal to the auction price paid for the same frequency. Due to its annual nature, it could 
be claimed that AIP lessens the need for the spectrum license holders to predict their revenue and 
profits streams far into the future, thus improving flexibility of the players to operate. At any point 
in time, when a spectrum user regards the value of spectrum to it less than the AIP payment, it is 
incentivized to give it up resulting in new assignment (or in some cases allocation) of the resource. 
In auctions on the other hand, the paid price as a whole is regarded as sunk cost. 
 
AIP may also be used in connection with administrative methods such as beauty contests in order to 
account for both monetary and non-monetary objectives. In addition, it can also be used on 
frequencies dedicated to public use, which often are “favored” in spectrum assignments sue to their 
societal purpose. There are some frequencies for which neither AIP, combined with an 
administrative assignment method, nor auctioning can be used. Examples include the so-called 
unlicensed frequencies, which are discussed in subsection 3.5.3.  
 
On the other hand, AIP payments assume that a regulator is able to set a payment that reflects the 
real value of spectrum to its users. In practice this is a challenging task due to asymmetric 
information, the many different uses that exist for specific spectrum resources (which one is the one 
bringing highest value?) and conflicts between private and social value already discussed in section 
2.6 of this thesis.  
 
Three different ways of determining the size of AIP payments have been proposed by economists 
and regulators.  The starting point is usually the opportunity cost of spectrum use. The core method, 
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called the Smith-NERA method is based on this principle. In addition to this method, there exist 
two alternative ways to calculate the optimal price; a method  by Levine and Rickman  (2007), 
which extends the Smith-NERA methodology to account for market structure and interference 
constraints, and a method which bases AIP payments on prices realized in market transactions. All 
of these methods and especially the most refined method of Levine and Rickman are discussed in 
detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
3.5.2 Spectrum as a natural resource  
 
As previously discussed, spectrum resources resemble natural resources in many respects. Thus, it 
would be only logical to explore the possibilities that existing natural resource regulation, pricing 
and trading schemes could bring to the discussion of managing scarce spectrum resources. 
 
The idea of spectrum as a natural resource is discussed by many scientists, recently for example by 
Ryan (2004 and 2005) in his articles “Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of 
Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum” and “Treating the Wireless Spectrum 
as a Natural Resource”.  Ryan concludes that there seems to exist a consensus on electromagnetic 
spectrum being, to some extent, a natural resource. However, it is not treated as such even though 
the current ways of regulation and spectrum management may be unsuitable given this fact. 
 
As the focus is on the AIP model this thesis refrains from more detailed discussion around the topic, 
but brings the issue up as a potential and interesting topic for further studies related to spectrum 
management.  
3.5.3 Unlicensed spectrum  
 
As was previously discussed, the use of AIP presupposes a licensing regime with exclusive usage 
rights for the license holders. Thus, one cannot thoroughly cover the concept of efficient use of 
spectrum or meaningfully talk about the future applicability of AIP without also discussing the 
other alternative to exclusive licenses i.e. the so-called unlicensed (or license-exempt) spectrum. 
This subchapter provides a concise representation of unlicensed spectrum, its connection with 
economic efficiency and implications on the use of AIP. 
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Unlicensed spectrum simply refers to those frequency bands in which users can operate without a 
license. In other words, different users share the same spectrum resources (aptly often called 
spectrum sharing). Thus, these parts of spectrum are treated as non-excludable, but still rivalrous 
(due to interference) common-pool resources as opposed to the private goods approach of licensed 
spectrum. As with any commons the problem of overuse, congestion and thus interference is likely 
to occur, when spectrum users do not account for the externality of interference they impose on 
others (also called the tragedy of the commons in economic literature). In order to avoid excess 
interference the users must therefore use certified radio equipment and must comply with the 
technical requirements (e.g. power limits) set by the regulator. The regulator’s, whether it is a 
national regulator or an international governing body, challenge to allocate spectrum resources to 
specific uses as described previously, includes the decision of how much spectrum to allocate to 
unlicensed uses. 
 
The idea of unlicensed spectrum as such is not novel; there have always been unlicensed spectrum 
bands and before the discovery of the value of radio spectrum (due to technological development) 
and thus the strict regulation of spectrum, spectrum resources were inherently unlicensed. The 
reason why unlicensed spectrum deserves to be introduced under the heading of “new approaches” 
is its increased significance since the late 1990s and the current heated discussion around it. 
 
The cause of discussion has mostly to do with dynamic efficiency, i.e. the ability of unlicensed 
spectrum to encourage innovation. This is due to the fact that many valuable innovations including 
spectrum, such as the development of Wi-Fi in the 2,4GHz band, have taken place on spectrum 
bands that are unlicensed (Milgrom, Levin & Eilat 2011, p. 1). This seems natural, since innovation 
is often best encouraged in an open environment; just think about all the technical applications 
developed in open-source environments without restricting property rights aspects, an example 
being the operating system Linux. Consequently, this has aroused the question of whether more 
spectrum should be allocated to unlicensed uses to encourage innovation. The development of 
interference restricting technologies has further intensified the debate since it has the possibility to 
overcome interference-related problems of unlicensed spectrum.  
 
Since unlicensed spectrum lays aside any barriers of entry it is especially efficient in encouraging 
third-party innovation, i.e. innovation by parties who do not necessarily own any licensed spectrum. 
This is mainly because the innovators no longer have to seek and pay for the approval of current 
license holders to let them develop and test their ideas in the spectrum bands that they have no 
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usage right to. The subsequent innovations can be substitutes for technologies utilized by licensed 
spectrum, thus increasing competition and efficiency of spectrum use; in which case the permission 
to develop them in the current licensees’ spectrum is likely to be revoked. Alternatively they can be 
complementary technologies, which increase the total demand for spectrum related services thus 
increasing the value of licensed spectrum. An example of the latter is Wi-Fi, a technology allowing 
an electronic device such as a smartphone or a tablet to exchange data wirelessly (using unlicensed 
frequencies) over a computer network.  The availability of Wi-Fi increases the demand for 
electronic devices that are able to utilize it, at the same time increasing demand for e.g. 3G mobile 
services (using licensed frequencies), since the devices are forced to use 3G outside Wi-Fi hotspots. 
The value increasing effects that the unlicensed spectrum has on licensed spectrum may even 
revoke the effect of revenues lost by the society, when instead of licensing spectrum and selling the 
licenses, spectrum is allocated to unlicensed free use. (Milgrom et al. 2011)  
 
However, as any form of property rights, licenses protect the usage of the resource and increase 
predictability over future events - or alternatively decrease the risk of disturbances by e.g. 
competitors.  Thus, licensing encourages the licensees to make related investments, such as building 
the infrastructure. As many uses of licensed spectrum, such as 3G and 4G wireless mobile 
technologies and radio as well as TV broadcasting, require large infrastructure investments 
licensing is a preferred method to ensure that these investment are made. 
 
Another concern with licensed spectrum has been the technical and thus productive efficiency of 
spectrum use (Milgrom et al. 2011, p. 11). This is because exclusive licenses provide the licensees 
with a right to use the spectrum in question at all times and possibly all over the nation (i.e. national 
licenses) even if the resources are only needed at certain times a day or in certain geographical 
areas. For example, just as people tend to consume more electricity during the day than at night 
many spectrum utilizing services (think about e.g. mobile phone usage within Finland) are 
consumed during the day rather than during nights. This indicates that at certain times (or in certain 
areas) the spectrum resources are severely underused. Several studies confirm this underutilization 
of part of the licensed spectrum (see e.g. Santivanez et al. 2006, Cave et al. 2007, Calabrese 2009). 
As a solution to the underutilization problem the introduction of unlicensed spectrum or spectrum 
sharing has been suggested, but the interference constraints have discouraged rapid and substantial 
changes so far. One example of the first steps towards more sharing can however be seen in the 
U.S. where FCC in cooperation with the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA), responsible for managing the spectrum used for federal purposes, 
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announced that it plans to take spectrum resources in the 3.5GHz area (specifically frequencies 
between 3550-3650MHz), which are currently used for radar and share it with wireless carriers 
(Arstechnica, 2012). 
 
All in all, having both unlicensed and licensed spectrum is attractive due to the diverse advantages 
that they offer. In other words, the existence and benefits from unlicensed spectrum do not mitigate 
the applicability or necessity of other spectrum management mechanisms, such as AIP, but 
complement them. In addition, one might envision possible hybrid solutions combining elements 
from unlicensed and licensed spectrum. An example would be a mechanism where spectrum is 
unlicensed, but users pay an access fee depending on the level of congestion of the band (Cave et al. 
2007, p.203). In this case AIP payments (at least in some form) might be applied also to unlicensed 
spectrum contradicting the prerequisite of a license regime.  
 
In this chapter spectrum management and its key objectives as well as the alternative spectrum 
management methods were introduced. The alternative methods were also compared to each other 
primarily against their fulfillment of economic efficiency consisting of productive, allocative and 
dynamic efficiency. Spectrum management methods were shown to include the administrative 
methods, i.e. lotteries, first-come-first-serve methods and beauty contests, market-based methods, 
i.e. auctions and secondary markets for spectrum, as well as the newer approaches of AIP, the 
viewpoint of frequencies as natural resources and the special case of unlicensed spectrum.  
 
With respect to economic efficiency the market-based methods were shown to be preferred. 
However, there was also shown to be situations where these cannot be utilized or where other 
objectives than economic efficiency necessitate the use of other methods; the most important case 
being unlicensed spectrum, which existence is claimed to encourage innovation increasing dynamic 
efficiency. Of the methods that are either market based (auctions, spectrum trading) or try to mimic 
market outcomes (AIP), auctioning was shown to be preferred for high demand and value 
frequencies under competitive settings whereas AIP can also be utilized in connection with 
administrative assignment methods and for pricing public service frequencies.  
 
Due to increasing demand and multifold applications for spectrum resources, new ways of thinking 
about spectrum management, assignment and pricing where shown to be crucial. Regarding 
spectrum as a natural resource and applying management methods and pricing used in connection 
with traditional natural resources was identified as a key opportunity for further studies. 
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Spectrum management was shown to include the international level of coordination through 
organizations such as ITU, which oversees spectrum management and the allocation of spectrum to 
uses, multinational level coordination through organs such as the EU and a national level governed 
by the national communications regulators. The decision-making power of national regulators in 
practice determining the AIP payments was shown to be restricted by international coordination in a 
way that it mostly includes the assignment, but not the allocation decisions. The multiplicity and 
sometimes even contradictory nature of different objectives of regulators was also pointed out.  
 
In the next chapter the existing alternative ways to calculate AIP payments are introduced, 
compared and analyzed with respect to the fulfillment of the requirement of economic efficiency. 
Chapter 5 then concludes the thesis. 
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4. Different methods of defining AIP payments 
 
After the need for administrative pricing of spectrum is established the question of how to 
determine the fee arises. So far there have been three alternative ways suggested for calculating AIP 
payments.  
 
Firstly, there is the method based on opportunity cost of spectrum use, which is currently utilized 
(with minor differences in calculation practices) in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand. This 
method is based on the fundamental economic understanding that a price based on opportunity cost 
guarantees that spectrum users cost spectrum resources as any other inputs in their production 
(Doyle 2007, p.1). This in turn implies productive efficiency. An observation of opportunity cost 
based pricing with spectrum resources originally dates back to Levin (1970) who stated that 
although a system of freely-transferable rights that works would be by far the best from a strictly 
economic viewpoint, it may be impossible to conduct (at least for all spectrum bands). Thus, we 
should be able to determine shadow prices that are derived from maximum sums that current 
spectrum users and systems designers would be willing to pay rather than do without some small 
amount of spectrum (these sums naturally referring to opportunity costs) to ensure efficient use of 
resources that cannot be priced by the market.  This methodology was later on proposed in touch 
with spectrum pricing by Smith and NERA (1996) and further elaborated by Indepen, Aegis and 
Warwick Business School (2004). The elaboration mainly consisted of taking into account the 
possibility of re-allocation of spectrum between uses, while Smith and NERA initially considered 
only changes in assignments between users as a result of imposing AIP payments. According to the 
first developers this method will be referred to as the Smith-NERA method.  
 
Secondly, Levine and Rickman (2007) have proposed a more rigorous method which builds on the 
Smith-NERA methodology. More specifically, Levine and Rickman have developed an optimal 
pricing scheme that allows for consumer surplus, interference constraints and their implications for 
productive efficiency, revenue implications and market structure. This method shall be referred to 
as the Levine-Rickman method from here on. Thirdly, it has been also suggested that AIP payments 
could be directly derived form observed market prices of spectrum generated in auctions or on the 
secondary markets for spectrum.  
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This chapter presents these three alternative ways developed and utilized up to date to estimate AIP 
payments. The focus is on the methodologies, not on the absolute values given per spectrum band, 
since the values strongly depend on the characteristics of technologies and uses of spectrum as was 
discussed in subsection 2.6.3 (the key value drivers). In other words, using these methodologies the 
AIP payments for different spectrum bands can be calculated, but some adjustments have to be 
made in order to take into account the individual characteristics of different uses and technologies 
utilizing the spectrum bands
10
. While discussing the different methods for constructing AIP 
payments I provide comments and critique related to the key assumptions. Separate sections 4.1.3, 
4.2.6 and 4.3 summarize these discussions per model. 
 
4.1 Opportunity cost based AIP payments – the Smith-NERA methodology 
 
In their paper “Study into the use of Spectrum Pricing” prepared for the Radiocommunications 
Agency Smith and NERA (1996) construct a simple framework to examine AIP payments based on 
opportunity costs. Their primary focus is on assignment decisions whereas Indepen et. al (2004) 
extend this framework to cover also allocation changes caused by imposed AIP payments. Thus, the 
Smith-NERA methodology presented next accounts for both efficiency gains from shifting 
spectrum resources from inefficient users to efficient ones as well as efficiency gains from altering 
the allocation, i.e. the use of spectrum. However, the same constraints and hindrances for allocation 
changes that were discussed in the previous chapters apply.  
4.1.1 Striving for productive efficiency  
 
Introduction to the Smith-NERA approach is initiated by introducing the First Welfare Theorem 
stating that a competitive equilibrium (i.e. a Walrasian equilibrium) is a Pareto optimum. Thus, 
when perfectly competitive markets prevail in equilibrium the price mechanism establishes relative 
prices such that the cost to society of producing X in terms of Y reflects consumers’ willingness to 
pay for such a transformation, i.e. the opportunity cost (Indepen et al. 2004, p.21). This theorem 
attests to the desirability of competitive markets. The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics then states that out of all possible Pareto-efficient outcomes, one can achieve any 
particular one by enacting a lump-sum wealth redistribution and then letting the market take over. 
                                                 
10
 For a more detailed description of the adjustments needed in the AIP payment by use/technology see e.g. Ofocm 
2010.  
41 
In other words, in a perfectly competitive economy where policy instruments are non-distorting, the 
‘first-best’ welfare maximizing outcome can be achieved.  
 
As far as spectrum management is concerned, the fact that equilibrium prices in a perfectly 
competitive market are in accordance with efficient outcomes brings us to the subsequent 
conclusion that prices equating supply and demand for spectrum are likely to promote efficiency. 
As economies in practice are not perfectly competitive, and appliance of lum-sum wealth 
redistributions is basically impossible, only second best outcomes are possible. However, according 
to the general theory of the second best
11
 it is not desirable to set prices at ‘first-best’ levels when 
distortions persist elsewhere in the economy. In addition, according theory on optimal taxation
12
, it 
is not recommended to tax the use of inputs when pursuing welfare maximizing outcomes in a 
second-best setting. This would suggest that the use of inputs in a competitive economy should 
satisfy conditions necessary for productive efficiency. (Indepen et al. 2004, p.21)    
 
Indepen et al. (2004, p.22) conclude that when competitive markets exist government policy should 
be directed towards the promotion of competition where possible and desirable, and tax instruments 
should be used mainly on final goods and services to achieve second-best welfare maximizing 
outcomes. Given this, the use of spectrum should satisfy conditions needed for productive 
efficiency. If this holds, policy as a whole ought to be consistent with a second-best welfare 
maximum. As a corollary, setting spectrum prices that promote productive efficiency is desirable 
for efficiency. 
4.1.2 A hypothetical example 
 
After it has been argued that the use of inputs should satisfy productive efficiency, the relationship 
between spectrum usage, pricing and productive efficiency can be studied.  Indepen et al. (2004) as 
well as Doyle (2007) provide simple, complementary examples utilizing basic microeconomic 
theory to discuss the link between efficiency and spectrum pricing. These examples allow for 
identifying the necessary conditions for productively efficient spectrum use and thus act as a 
                                                 
11
 Smith –NERA refer to Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) discussing the theory of the second best; R.G. Lipsey and K. 
Lancaster (1956) “The general theory of the second best”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 24, pp. 11-32. 
12
Smith –NERA refer toDiamond and Mirrlees (1971) discussing optimal taxation;  Peter Diamond and James Mirrlees 
(1971) “Optimal taxation and public production 1: Production efficiency and 2: Tax rules”, American Economic 
Review, vol. 61, pp. 8-27 and 261-78.  
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cornerstone for developing incentive spectrum pricing. These examples are presented and discussed 
next.
13
  
 
Assume that the available spectrum resources lie on a unit interval [0,1] and they are used by two 
sectors, 1 and 2. In other words, there are two differing uses for the spectrum resources in the 
economy, for example broadcasting and telephony. Alternatively, one might think of a certain 
frequency band being assigned between two users; for example a band of frequencies allocated to 
TV broadcasting use assigned between two TV broadcasting companies. The two sectors utilize two 
types of inputs, spectrum and labor in order to produce the respective final outputs (broadcasting 
and telephony services). Thus, labor and spectrum are regarded as substitute goods. Note that the 
other input in the production in addition to spectrum might as well be any other input, e.g. base 
stations, so that lack of spectrum resources could be replaced by investing in infrastructure. In other 
words, substitutes for spectrum exist.  
 
There are many other sectors beside these two in the economy, but they do not utilize spectrum. 
However, they do make use of other inputs such as capital and they also demand labor. Thus, any 
amount of labor unused in the two sectors utilizing spectrum is valued in the other sectors of the 
economy. The total amount of labor in the economy equals L and the wage rate w>0 is determined 
on a competitive market. The labor resources used by sector 1 equal l1 and by sector 2 l2, the amount 
of labor utilized in sectors 1 and 2 equaling l1+ l2 ≤ L. In addition, the prices of all final outputs 
produced in the economy are determined in a competitive market and firms take the prices as given. 
Prices for the outputs produced by sectors 1 and 2 are denoted with p1 and p2 respectively. 
However, there exists a market imperfection, which is the lack of a market for spectrum. In other 
words, spectrum is allocated to the sectors using administrative proceedings such as lotteries, 
beauty contests or first-come-first serve methods instead of with the help of market mechanisms. 
Note that this still is the case in many countries. For simplicity assume that frequencies as such 
(excluding cost recovery) carry a zero price, as was previously shown to usually be the case in 
administrative allocation. The costs of the regulator from spectrum management are covered 
through general taxation.  
 
                                                 
13
 I have intertwined these two examples into one uniform example. In order to do this I have made some minor 
modifications to the notation of the example presented by Indepen et. al (2004) in order to allow for a sufficiently 
theoretical presentation - note that the original paper was intended for regulatory use and was thus intentionally 
expressed in layman’s  terms  rather than using a notation in line with the economic practice. The basic story and results 
naturally stay unaffected by the notation modifications. 
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From the available amount of spectrum (=1) let 0 < s < 1 be the amount of spectrum originally 
allocated to sector 1 and 1-s allocated to sector 2. The firms in each sector are profit maximizers
14
 
choosing inputs and thus the output in order to achieve this goal. The profit is maximized with 
respect to possible spectrum resource constraints reflecting the scarcity of spectrum; the usage of 
spectrum cannot exceed supply. Other types of scarcity constraints, the interference constraints 
discussed previously, are imposed by the fact that spectrum can be re-used in some sectors, but not 
in others due to interference. A more mathematical presentation of the optimization problem is 
given in subsection XX, but here the basic principle of the opportunity cost based pricing can be 
shown with this more general example. The total output produced in sector 1 is denoted by Q1(s,l1) 
and in sector 2 by Q2(1-s,l2). In this example the production function is assumed to be concave with 
diminishing returns i.e. Qi’ > 0 and Qi’’< 0, with i=1,2, but the logic also applies to production 
functions of other forms
15
.  
 
From the spectrum demand point of view there are naturally three scenarios which may occur: 
demand for spectrum in equal to supply in each sector, demand is below supply in each sector or 
demand for one or both sectors exceeds the supply. In the absence of excess demand (the first and 
second scenarios) it can be argued that the economy is at an efficient point, since no further profit 
can be gained by substituting costly labor or other inputs with free spectrum resources. If it were 
possible the profit maximizing and thus cost minimizing firms would have done it ultimately 
causing excess demand for spectrum.  
 
From the regulators (and efficiency’s) point of view the interesting scenario is the last one, where 
excess demand for spectrum exists. This is the case with many spectrum resources such as the ones 
used for mobile services (especially the 3G and 4G frequencies mentioned previously). The 
existence of excess demand raises the question of whether the current resources could be re-
allocated to achieve efficiency gains. The efficiency gains could be achieved if a re-allocation of 
spectrum freed up some of the labor (the other input) resources without necessitating a reduction in 
the overall output produced in each sector. The freed labor resources could be used in other sectors 
                                                 
14
 It is important to note one important shortcoming of the illustrative example: there are also firms utililizing spectrum 
that are not profit-maximizers such as many public sector users of spectrum. The example can be however be extended 
to cover them by allowing for cost minimization rather than profit maximization and the implications on spectrum 
pricing prevail. The necessity of imposing AIP on public spectrum users is also discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
15
 Different forms of production functions for spectrum utilizing services and their plausibility, as well as effects on 
optimal pricing of spectrum, are discussed next in section 4.2.   
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to increase the overall output of the economy. Thus, the initial spectrum allocation would be 
productively inefficient.  
 
In order to examine whether a re-allocation of spectrum resources could induce efficiency gains the 
effect of a marginal change in spectrum allocation is considered. The re-allocation is assumed to be 
such that outputs Q1 and Q2 remain constant, i.e. the use of the other input (labor) is adjusted. 
Keeping the output constant allows the focus to be on productive efficiency. The re-allocation from 
an inefficient point to an efficient one can be illustrated in the Edgeworth box in figure 3, where 
point b illustrates the original inefficient point.  
 
 
Figure 3. Efficiency illustrated in the Edgeworth box 
 
Source: Indepen et al. 2004 
 
In figure 3 the spectrum inputs are in full utilization (s1+  s2 = s), i.e. technical efficiency is 
achieved. The isoquants, which portray the different combinations of inputs with which the output 
remains constant, correspond to the previously determined concave production functions with 
diminishing returns to scale. Isoquants for sector 1 are depicted as convex to the origin and 
isoquants for sector 2 in the opposite corner with increasing output towards the origin. As can be 
seen from the figure current market outcome at point b is inefficient as a re-allocation in spectrum 
(and consequently in labor resources) brings forth an improvement in overall quantity of output 
without impairing the quantity produced by the other sector. When a re-allocation cannot benefit the 
other sector without harming the other, the allocation satisfies productive efficiency and the solution 
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lies on the contract curve of Pareto efficient outcomes i.e. on the curve in which the isoquants of the 
two sectors are tangential. This is the bolded curve in figure 3. For example, the regulator may 
strive to the efficient point c in the Edgeworth box. This happens by allocating more spectrum 
resources to sector 1 and consequently decreasing its use of labor.  
 
We can assess the extent of inefficiency in the initial allocation (point b) in terms of the other input 
used by the spectrum utilizing sectors, i.e. labor. Suppose that after a marginal change in the 
spectrum resources, for example an increase (decrease) in s, denoted by Δs, the same output in 
sector 1 Q1 can be produced by using Δl1 units less (more) labor. It is now possible to infer value of 
spectrum Δs in terms of labor, i.e. wΔl1; the value of input resources that would be saved by 
allocating Δs to sector 1 instead of sector 2. The same holds naturally for sector 2 where the value of 
Δs is wΔl2. These values are the marginal benefits (MB) of spectrum and represent estimates of the 
marginal opportunity cost of spectrum since by definition opportunity cost is the cost of an 
alternative that must be forgone in order to pursue a certain action
16
. These values allow AIP 
payments to be calculated correctly, but require an understanding of close substitutes for spectrum 
and their relationship with spectrum resources. Thus, the scarcity necessitates trade-offs and trade-
offs result in opportunity costs. When prices are set equal to opportunity cost, the firms treat 
spectrum as any other input in production, choose the inputs to minimize these costs thus achieving 
productive efficiency.  
 
The marginal benefit curves for the two sectors of the example are illustrated in figure 4. The 
decreasing returns to scale can be seen in the downward sloping shape of the marginal benefit 
curves. The initial allocation of spectrum s (amount s for sector 1 and 1-s for sector 2) with the 
corresponding marginal benefits of the sectors being MB1 and MB2 can be seen to be inefficient, 
since re-allocating spectrum from sector 2 to sector 1 with a higher marginal benefit would improve 
efficiency.  
 
                                                 
16
 In fact since the Smith-NERA method looks at opportunity costs calculated at the margin by viewing how small 
incremental changes in spectrum affect input substitutability, the approach actually studies marginal rate of technical 
substitution and values attained can be viewed as marginal technical opportunity costs derived from the production 
functions (Indepen &Aedis 2007, p.13). 
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Figure 4. Marginal benefit functions of spectrum 
 
 
Source: Indepen et al. 2004 
 
Efficiency is in turn satisfied at s* where the marginal benefits across sectors are equal and thus no 
further improvements can be made. In practice, the regulator however does not have the possibility 
of getting accurate information about the shape of the marginal benefit functions. Nevertheless, this 
is not necessary since the regulator may use estimated marginal benefits at current assignments and 
allocations, i.e. the opportunity costs of spectrum at the current situation. Doyle (2007, p.7-9) 
continues by illustrating this with a following hypothetical example.  
 
First assume that spectrum resources consist of three non-overlapping spectrum bands a,b and c in 
the interval [0,1]. These frequencies have been allocated to three different and competing uses I, II 
and III. The current allocations are depicted in table 1 below with the highlighted cells and the 
numbers stand for marginal benefits across different uses.  In addition, a substitute input is depicted 
in the right-most column. 
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Table 1. Marginal benefits of spectrum 
 
Source: Doyle 2007 
 
Thus, use I utilizes frequency band a, use II frequency band b and use III frequency band c.  The 
highlighted cells, i.e. the current allocations depict the estimated opportunity cost values that a 
regulator can estimate most easily. The way of calculating them in practice is explained in detail in 
the next subsection 4.1.3.  
 
Again, the inefficiency of the initial allocation can be seen, since the marginal benefits for spectrum 
bands across uses (the colums in the table) are not equalized.  The frequencies in band a allocated to 
use I are in their most efficient use, since the marginal benefit of the two alternative uses II and III 
are lower than the marginal benefit at current use. However, frquencies in band b have a higher 
marginal benefit at use I (MB=75) than in their current use II (MB=60). Thus, by allocating more 
spectrum from use II to use I increases efficiency. This re-allocation naturally affects the marginal 
benefits of the uses that are affected by the change. The changes are depicted in table 2 below. 
Specifically, when more spectrum b is allocated to use I the marginal benefit in use I of frequency 
band b will fall below 75 due to the decreasing returns to scale. Similarly the marginal benefit in 
use I of frequency band a falls below 100, since there are now more spectrum resources allocated to 
use I. In addition, an opposite effect is seen in use II of frequency bands a, b and c.  
 
Table 2. Marginal benefits of spectrum after the first re-allocation 
 
Source: Doyle 2007 
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Thus, now the marginal benefits of frequency bands a and b in uses I and II have changed as well as 
the MB of frequency band c in use II. Now the MB’s of frequency band b between uses I and II are 
equalized, which implies that for frequency band b the allocation is efficient. Again the highlighted 
cells are the ones that the regulator can more easily calculate in practice, since they correspond to 
the current allocations and assignments.  
 
We can see that there still is scope for further efficiency gains by re-allocating spectrum in band c 
form use III (MB=15) to use II (MB=32). Following the same logic as above this re-allocation will 
decrease the MBs of frequency bands a, b and c in use II as the total amount of spectrum in that use 
increases. In addition, the change will increase the MBs of frequency bands a, b and c in use III, 
which now has overall less spectrum. As a result the MBs of spectrum band b between uses I and II 
will no longer be equal and yet a further re-allocation of frequency band b is needed. After the 
requisite re-allocations an efficient solution illustrated by table 3 is achieved.  
 
Table 3. Marginal benefits of spectrum at the efficient solution 
 
Source: Doyle 2007 
 
In table 3 above there is equality of marginal benefits across uses in the two highest values.  No 
further re-allocations would yield better outcomes and thus the solution is efficient. 
 
Thus, arriving at an efficient outcome, i.e. achieving allocative efficiency, is an iterative process 
where one (or possibly several) re-allocations or assignments are made at a time and the changed 
marginal benefits then calculated again to show the possible the need for further re-allocations or 
re-assignments within uses. It can also be seen that in order to achieve the efficient outcome the 
regulator needs to know about the MBs of frequency bands in neighboring uses. These values are 
proposed to be evaluated based on the costs of alternatives. 
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In other words, this method basically suggests that the regulator needs to be able to first identify all 
frequency bands and associated uses and then determine the marginal benefits for each of them 
utilizing a least cost alternative, i.e. determining, what is the spectrum user’s alternative (substitute) 
way of offering the service if a marginal amount of spectrum is taken from him. Using these 
estimations for MB’s the regulator identifies the direction of needed change in spectrum re-
allocation and sets the prices for spectrum accordingly to encourage these changes. The actual price 
set depends on whether the maximum marginal benefit is offered by the current use or by a use that 
currently does not utilize the spectrum resource. In the former case the price is set at the value of the 
current use whereas in the latter case the price should lie on the interval between MB* and the 
current use marginal benefit (for a more detailed discussion, see Doyle 2007, p 9-11). This 
procedure starts an iterative process towards the efficient allocation or assignment, which may take 
up to five years or so (Doyle 2007, p. 10). 
4.1.3 Criticisms of the Smith-NERA method  
 
While the Smith-NERA methodology is simple and thus can be easily communicated to regulators 
setting the policies, its straightforwardness comes at a price. In particular, the methodology assumes 
perfect markets and thus refrains from discussing any issues related to market structure. This is a 
key weakness of the approach, since many of the spectrum-utilizing markets are highly 
concentrated, which is also reflected as high end prices of spectrum utilizing products and services 
for the customers. For example, in Germany, the United States, Spain and Greece, where there exist 
no challenger operators, the mobile data rates per gigabyte are 30-100 times higher than in the 
highly competed markets in Finland, Denmark and the UK (Taloussanomat, 25.3.2014). 
 
Another key limitation of the model is that it does not explicitly account for interference or 
interference constraints, which were previously shown to be the major driver behind the need for 
spectrum management in the first place. This is mainly due to the fact that the Smith-NERA model 
is based on simplistic economic assumptions of a non-existing state of the market (perfect 
competition). As will be shown in the next subchapter 4.2 this is a key issue corrected in the 
approach by Levine and Rickman, achieved by supplementing the basic economic theory with 
graph theory, which allows for constructing interference constraints to the model. 
 
In addition, the approach does take into account productive efficiency, but it ignores other effects 
such as the consumers' willingness to pay and revenue raised by the government (Levine & 
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Rickman 2007, p.2). The dynamic efficiency as such is also left unexplained and depends on the 
idea that a firm that values the spectrum resources most today is also the best innovator in the long 
run. If we think about the private value build-up discussed in 2.6.1 we see that this often may not be 
the case: for example a possibility to stall or damage competitors, indicated by a nonnegative 
defensive value (DV) parameter, might increase the valuation a spectrum user has for the spectrum 
resources without having anything to do with the actual willingness and capabilities of the user to 
guarantee sufficient investments to achieve dynamic efficiency. Finally, the fact that the smallest 
decrements in spectrum used for evaluating the opportunity cost may actually be very large for 
some services implies that the assumption of the output remaining constant may be unrealistic 
(Aegis & Plum 2008, p.19).   
 
Many of these issues are addressed by the extended model for AIP determination by Levine and 
Rickman, which is discussed next. 
4.2 Optimal Administrative Incentive Pricing of spectrum by Levine and 
Rickman (2007) 
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter the AIP calculation approach developed by Smith and 
NERA and further enhanced by Indepen et al. has been criticized for its simplistic assumptions as 
well as omitting certain structures of the actual economies in which the firms operate. To correct 
some of these flaws Levine and Rickman (2007) have constructed a mathematical framework 
combining models from information technology and economics to explain the structure and 
attainment of optimal AIP payments. In particular they take into account interference and market 
structures (other than perfect competition proposed by Smith-NERA) and allow for revenue 
implications to the regulator or government from the collection of AIP payments. AIP 
determination is regarded as an optimization problem where the regulator effectively maximizes 
overall welfare with respect to the spectrum fee given resource and interference constraints. Their 
work combines both approaches of productive and allocative efficiency and is introduced and 
discussed in this subchapter. 
4.2.1 Formulation of the spectrum assignment problem 
 
The assignment of spectrum to users can also be called channel assignment since a channel is 
simply a specified frequency range.
17
 The spectrum assignment problem is in this section termed as 
                                                 
17
 For example in Finland the national (tv) channel 5 operates on frequencies from 174MHz to 181MHz (Ficora 2012). 
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the channel assignment problem in order to follow the well-known terminology used throughout the 
literature discussing this issue. The channel assignment problem can be seen as a mathematical 
problem of dividing scarce spectrum resources (i.e. channels) between competing, though 
predetermined (since allocation has been conducted) set of demands while taking into account the 
constraints imposed by interference (Levine & Rickman 2007, p. 3).  In other words, the problem 
specification consists of information on requirements (demand) for spectrum across the system, the 
constraints imposed to limit interference and the specification of the objective to be fulfilled while 
satisfying the spectrum requirements and the interference constraints. 
 
The spectrum requirements are introduced by specifying the amount of distinct channels each 
transmitter site reguires. For n different transmitter sites T1, T2, T3…Tn there exist corresponding 
demands of m1, m2, m3…mn channels, where site Ti requires mi distinct channels. We have a set of 
constraints each relating to a single transmitter site Ti, known as co-site constraints or to a pair of 
transmitter sites (Ti, Tj), known as inter-site constraints. For simplicity, the different channels are 
labeled with integer numbers, which correspond to the location of the channels in the spectrum 
band. When
)(
1
i
f and 
)(
2
i
f are channels both assigned to a transmitter site Ti the co-site constraint 
requires that,    
i
ii
ff 
)(
2
)(
1    (1) 
 
where i  is a specified minimum channel separation, i.e. distance in the spectrum between two 
distinct channels, which ensures that interference between the channels is kept tolerable. Then 
naturally for channels 
)(i
f
 
and
 )( j
f assigned to different transmitter sites Ti and Tj the inter-site 
constraint requires that, 
ij
ji ff  )(
)(
   (2) 
 
where similarly to (1) ij  is a specified minimum channel separation. The interference limiting co-
site and inter-site constraints are thus specified by i  and ij  constructing the constraint matrix, 
where i  form the diagonal entries and ij  the non-diagonal entries. These constraints reflect the 
use of protection ratio (i.e. the signal-to-interference ratio) in the radio community. 
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The objective of the channel assignment problem can be specified as either minimizing the span 
required (i.e. the difference between the highest and lowest channel used) subject to the constraints, 
or as a fixed spectrum problem where given the maximum span (i.e. the amount of spectrum 
available) the channels are assigned to as many spectrum requirements as possible. The latter 
approach is used by Levine and Rickman. This approach implies that the transmitter network and 
power are fixed and thus effectively taken into account by the constraint matrix. An alternative 
would be to have these as extra variables in the model to be optimized with the channel assignment, 
but such theoretical work is scarce and thus the more simplistic approach is taken. (Levine & 
Rickman 2007, p.5) 
 
The channel assignment problem constructed above has been studied with the help of basic graph 
theory and specifically the graph-coloring problem.
18
 A graph is a collection of abstract ‘nodes’, of 
which some are joined by ‘edges’. The coloring problem attaches a color to each of the nodes in a 
way that no adjacent nodes share the same color and the overall amount/number of colors is 
minimized. This minimum number of colors is called the chromatic number of the graph. This 
problem relates directly to channel assignment when the nodes are thought of as transmitter sites 
and the colors as channels. For example, if we determine that mi equals 1 i.e. each transmitter 
requires only one channel, and ij  equals 1 if the nodes Ti and Tj are joined and 0 otherwise we end 
up with the minimum span channel assignment problem discussed above (since each site requires 
one channel the values for co-site constraints i  are immaterial). In physical terms, we model co-
channel (instead of adjacent channel) interference and the edges represent the rough location of 
potential coverage blackspots. (p.5) 
 
The next step is to relate the channel assignment problem to an economic model explaining 
spectrum demand in terms of market conditions and costs. This is done by assuming that each node 
or transmitter site incorporates a local market with an oligopolistic market structure. This is in 
accordance with many of the actual product and service markets utilizing spectrum in real life (as 
was previously discussed in 4.1.3) and brings a clear correction to the Smith-NERA model which 
assumes perfect competition. There should be no restrictions in interpreting the local markets as 
national markets (e.g. the Finnish mobile communications market) or alternatively as local markets 
within national markets (e.g. mobile communications market within the Eastern Finland). The firms 
                                                 
18
 For a more thorough explanation of graph theory and the graph coloring problem see e.g. “Graph Theory” by Diestel 
Reinhard (Springer 2006). 
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operating in these local markets are assumed to provide homogeneous products. Note that products 
across markets can still differ. A spatial interpretation of the transmitter sites is to regard them as 
cells i.e. specific regions of service. Thus, a transmitter site consists of all the transmitters used by 
the firms in the local market and they may share some of the transmitters, perhaps against a fee. 
 
In each cell a local oligopoly offers a local service, produced with spectrum resources (channels) as 
inputs. The firms purchase a license (which is equivalent to charging an AIP from their use) from 
the regulator to use a certain amount of channels depending on the level of output. Within a cell the 
firms are so close to each other that no spectrum re-use or sharing can occur between them, and we 
assume that there exists only co-channel interference, i.e. i =1 in (1) and ij =0 or 1 in (2). This 
assumption by Levine and Rickman is in accordance with reality, as a certain geographical distance 
is required in order to be able to share frequencies (see chapter 2.3 for more details). The demand of 
spectrum is defined by the sum of demands of the individual firms, to be modeled in 4.2.2. 
 
Each cell is given a color and a shared color indicates that spectrum sharing is possible between the 
regions. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate this in a world with four local markets (i.e. four nodes). 
 
Figure 5. A four node graph of four markets 
 
 
Source: Levine and Rickman 2007 
 
In figure 5 the nodes A-D represent the transmitter sites around which the local markets are formed.  
 
Figure 6. A coloured map of four markets 
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Source: Levine and Rickman 2007 
 
In Figure 6 the graph has been colored with two colors in the previously determined way where no 
adjacent nodes receive the same color. The four local markets are formed around the four nodes. 
The numbers inside circles represent the demand for frequencies (or channels) in each market and 
shared colors across diagonal markets indicate the possibility for these markets to share frequencies. 
Due to this possibility of sharing the total demand for frequencies, which equals 60 channels 
(10+20+10+20) can be satisfied with a minimum of 40 distinct channels. An exemplary division of 
frequencies is as follows. Market A is assigned with channels 1-10, of which market D can re-use 
all ten channels and in addition requires ten channels more, say 31-40. Market B is assigned with 
channels 11-30, of which market C can re-use channels 11-20.  
4.2.2 The core economic model 
 
This subsection constructs the economic model, which is then combined with the spectrum 
assignment problem depicted in the previous section. First a single local market with N competing 
firms and a homogenous service offered at price P is considered (sectors and sector-crossing sales 
are included later on). The total output Q  in the local market equals the individual firms’ outputs 
 
N
k k
qQ
1
, where k=1,2,…N. The output can be thought of as minutes of a service requiring 
frequencies as inputs. The demand curve is given by )(PDQ   with the usual property 0)(' PD  
stating that demand diminishes as price increases. It is also assumed that 0)(lim  PPDP . The 
inverse demand is denoted by )()(
1 QPQDP   . The output of each firm is produced using labor 
(L), capital (K) and frequencies (Z) as inputs according to a general CES production function. Later 
on Levine and Rickman specify this, but first the basic form is assumed (without the firm 
subscript): 
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     /1/2211 )1()1( KZLTq  ,  (3) 
 
where T measures the total factor productivity and  1 and  2 are the share parameters and ε and η 
parameters determining the elasticity of substitution between inputs. Capital and spectrum have 
been grouped together, giving them an elasticity of substitution of 1/1+ε and the elasticity of 
substitution between labor and the grouped input (Z,K) being 1/1+η. In other words, if )1,0(  and 
0 , spectrum and capital are considered substitutes whereas labor is a complement for these 
inputs. In reality this seems like a rational assumption since we know that lack of spectrum can to 
some extent be made up for by building a more extensive infrastructure (requiring capital)
19
, but 
increasing the amount of labor does not increase output if spectrum resources are lacking. On the 
other hand labor and capital usually can be regarded as at least partial substitutes. Thus, without the 
main conclusions being compromised, we can alternatively have a production function of the form: 
 
     /1/2211 )1()1( KLZTq  ,  (4) 
 
where spectrum is a complement for capital and labor which in turn are substitutes to each other. In 
the limit as   and   tend to 0, both (3) and (4) approach the production function of the Cobb-
Douglas form: 



3
1
321 1;
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iKZTLq 
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   (5) 
Given one of these forms (3)-(5) and factor prices ),,( arw  it is possible to formulate the cost 
function ),,( arwc as: 
2,1);,,(),,(),,(),,(  iarwaZarwrKarwwLarwc iiii   (6) 
 
where ),,( arwL , ),,( arwK and ),,( arwZ  are the associated factor demands per unit of output 
which by convention satisfy 
a
Z
r
K
w
L






,, < 0. The firms are assumed to be price takers in the factor 
                                                 
19
 As an example one can think of a situation where a mobile communications firm lacks lower frequencies which 
require less infra since their range is longer, but has a sufficient amount of higher frequencies which may be as suitable 
for the technology utilized/service provided as the lower ones but due to their shorter range require more infra. Thus, 
the lack of lower frequencies can to some extent be made up for by utilizing the higher frequencies by increasing capital 
K.  
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markets including the spectrum license market which incorporates all the local markets. In addition, 
it is assumed that the price elasticity of demand 
QdP
PdQ
Q  )( , is constant with respect to 
output Q  and ϵ >1, which will be justified later on (see function 13).  
 
First the regulator sets the spectrum license price a after which the firms compete in the market 
given the factor prices. This leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium which can be found by 
backward induction. Levine and Rickman assume a Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the second stage 
of the game. Thus, the regulator acts as a Stackelberg leader in the first phase by setting the price. 
The game is solved for both the case with an exogenous number of firms as well as the case with an 
endogenous number of firms dictated by a condition of free entry and thus zero profits. 
 
Levine and Rickman (2007, p.8-10) first consider the equilibrium with an exogenous number of 
firms.  Given the core economic model presented above, profits Π for a firm (indexed by k) are: 
 
  FqarwcParwq kkkkk  ),,(),,,( ,  (7) 
 
where F stands for fixed costs, which are independent of output. We can write the total output as 
kk qqQ  where kq stands for the outputs of all but the k
th
 firm. In a market clearing this 
naturally equals the total demand )(PD .  In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium the k
th
 firm takes kq  as 
well as the inverse demand )()( 11 kk qqDQDP 

 and spectrum price a  as given while 
choosing its output level as a strategic response. Since at the second stage of the game (when the 
regulator has set the spectrum price) the firm is a follower in the leader-follower game, and thus a 
price-taker, there does not exist any strategic bidding for licenses. This is a clear difference 
compared to traditional auction theory which also discusses and allows for strategic bidding and can 
be argued to be a defection of the model. 
 
The firm thus maximizes (7 above) with respect to its output kq given kq , a and the market-
clearing condition )()(
11
kk qqDQDP 

. The first order condition is given by: 
 
0),,('  arwcPqP kk     (8) 
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and the second order condition by 
0'''2  PqP k     (9) 
Rearranging the FOC (8) reveals the familiar mark-up pricing formula for an oligopolist: 
Q
q
arwc
P
k
k



1
),,(
    (10) 
where 
QdP
PdQ
Q  )(  represents the elasticity of demand. As the number of firms increases 
the price tends to marginal cost ),,( arwck . Since it was assumed that the firms are identical 
(offering homogenous services) it must be that NqNqQ k  , thus each firm produces the same 
amount of output. Thus, the oligopolist’s pricing result (10) becomes 
 
),(),,,(
1
1
),,(
NaPNarwP
N
arwc
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

    (11) 
 
where wages w and interest rates r have been omitted from the right-most expression since they are 
exogenously determined by the general equilibrium in which the market model is embedded. A key 
interpretation of equation (11) is that the price for the end products and services is dependent on the 
number of firms i.e. the competitive situation in the market and the price set by the regulator for 
spectrum. Effectively this simple conclusion further attests to to the need of setting optimal, not 
excessively high AIP’s as, in addition to leaving spectrum unused, a high AIP is reflected as high 
end prices, which diminishes consumer surplus. The condition ϵN>ϵ>1 ensures that the price is 
always positive and it is also the second-order condition for the profit maximization. In order to see 
this we can write a constant elasticity demand curve as 
 APQ . Differentiating twice with 
respect to Q we get: 
P
P
P
2)')(1(
''

     (12) 
 
Substituting this for ''P in the second order condition (99), noting that NQqqk / and using 
'P < 0 as well as the stated elasticity of demand QdP
PdQ  it is relatively easy to see that 
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12
1

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N
     (13) 
 
must hold. And thus, since 2N-1≤ 1for N≥1, clearly ϵ>1 is sufficient for (XX ylempi) to hold. The 
reasoning for this is that given if the demand does not adjust to changes in prices or adjusts very 
little (low price elasticity of demand) firms can increase prices and thus their profits indefinitely by 
reducing output. In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with N identical firms output of an individual firm 
is given by NNaPDNQq /)),((/  with profits given by:  
 
  FNNaPDarwcNaPNa  /)),((),,(),(),(   (14) 
 
This leads to a following proposition (Levine & Rickman 2007, p.10):  
 
Proposition 1: Assuming ϵ > 1 gives profits of Π ),( Na , which decrease with respect to a  and 
N (for proof see Appendix 3). 
 
The explanation for this is quite natural. As license prices increase so do the firm’s total costs which 
shows as an increase in the retail price when at least part of the costs are transferred to prices. As a 
result demand decreases and assuming an elasticity of demand greater than unity implies that the 
overall revenue falls and decreases profit. As for the effect of N on profits, increase in the number 
of firms, i.e. stronger competition, lowers retail prices resulting in lower mark-ups, but also in 
higher demand. With constant elasticity of demand ϵ > 1 and sharing the revenue with more firms 
the overall effect on profits of individual firms is negative. 
 
The number of firms competing in the market (N) has thus far been exogenous. We now move to 
consider the equilibrium with an endogenous number of firms. There are two alternative ways to 
endogenize this parameter (Levine & Rickman, 2007, p.10): by making N into a policy variable 
determined by the regulator while issuing the licenses, or assuming free entry of firms into the 
market with the participation constraint stating that profits cannot turn negative
20
.  Levine and 
Rickman apply the latter principle. This can be seen as a clear distinction from reality, since there 
do exist significant barriers to entry in the markets utilizing frequencies as inputs. This is mainly 
due to the reason that in many such markets (e.g. mobile communications services) heavy 
                                                 
20
 Naturally this is also the result the market ends up with free entry, since the firms with negative profits eventually bail 
out as they go bankrupt. Profits are thus driven to zero. 
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investments in infrastructure (transmitter sites etc.) are required for setting up sufficiently large 
scale operations to be profitable. Thus the incumbents have strong positions against potential 
entrants, which would have to “start from scratch” or operate by leasing the incumbents readily 
available infrastructure.  Actually the first approach of endogenizing N by making it a policy 
variable determined by the regulator makes much more sense in reality. As was discussed earlier in 
one of the main objectives of the regulator is to promote competition, which in practice is done e.g. 
though setting bidding caps in spectrum auctions to ensure that there will be a sufficient amount of 
license holders at the end of the assignment. On the other hand the same bidding requirements can 
be used to restrict the amount of players in the market. In effect, regulators can be seen as 
determining N through these types of measures. However, the choice of method in endogenizing the 
number of firms in the model by Levine and Rickman should have no effect in the upper-level 
conclusions or propositions provided by their analysis and thus we continue with the assumption 
that free entry to the market exists. 
 
With free entry profits are driven to zero i.e. the number of firms in equilibrium N*, given license 
price a  satisfies21 
0*),(  Na     (15) 
 
According to proposition 1 the profits are decreasing in N and they become negative for a 
sufficiently large N. If it is assumed that for a monopolist the profits are positive i.e. Π( a ,1) > 0 
then there exists a unique N* satisfying (15). In addition, differentiating (15) with respect to the 
license price a  and remembering proposition 1 we get: 
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i.e. the number of firms in the market is negatively dependent on the size of license price a . From 
proposition 1 we can also conclude that Π(0,1) > Π( a ,1) > 0. Also by remembering 
0)(lim  PPDP we may deduce that Π( a ,1) becomes negative with a sufficiently large a . In 
other words, if the license price (also thought of as the access price to the market) is sufficiently 
                                                 
21
 Note that free entry will lead to suboptimal duplication of fixed costs F (Levine & Rickman, 2007, p.11). See also 
Perry (1984). 
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high even for a monopolist the profits may turn negative so that the monopolist eventually exits the 
market. 
 
The total demand for channels (m), given the license price and the number of firms in the optimum 
N*( a ), is determined by the product of the number of firms and their respective use of spectrum 
input Z: 
)()(*)(* aZaNam      (17) 
 
Differentiating with respect to a  using the Leibniz rule gives: 
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and since both the number of firms and the amount of spectrum inputs used in production are 
negatively related to the spectrum (license) price it is obvious that d m( a )/d a < 0. The results given 
above are combined to give the following proposition (Levine & Rickman, 2007, p.11): 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 2:  
i) Given access price a  and the demand curve D(P) there exists a unique number of firms 
N( a )* in the market. 
ii) N*( a ) is decreasing in a . 
iii) A sufficiently high a  exists to lead to all firms exiting the market.  
iv) Total demand for channels m*( a ) is decreasing in a . 
 
Sub-proposition iii) demonstrates the power that the regulator has and on the other hand the 
cautiousness it has to show while determining the level of AIP. The aim is not only to ensure that 
frequencies are used, but also that the firms’ operational prerequisites are not jeopardized by the 
additional costs incurred due to the AIP payment.  
 
In addition, the final result iv) is crucial as will be shown in the next section. Levine and Rickman 
(2007, p.12) separate two effects leading to this result, which both have to do with demand of the 
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end products produced using spectrum as input. Firstly, for a given number of firms the demand for 
end products decreases due to firms transference of increased costs (increased a ) into their prices. 
Secondly, due to the increased costs some firms are forced to exit the market increasing the market 
power of the firms still left in the market. The increased market power is used to raise the mark-up 
on their end product pricing, which again decreases the demand for end products. Naturally the 
decreased demand of end products results in a decrease in the demand of inputs used to produce 
them i.e. spectrum (channels).     
4.2.3 Optimal spectrum pricing  
Next we extend the model to account for several sectors instead of just the one local market 
discussed in 4.2.2.  The services and products offered within sectors are still assumed to be 
homogenous. In addition, services across sectors are assumed to be independent of each other i.e. 
neither substitutes nor complements. The correspondence between this assumption and the reality is 
two-fold. On one hand most of the services utilizing spectrum fulfill the assumption; it is difficult to 
find any substitutability or complementarity between commercial services such as TV broadcasting 
and governmental use of spectrum such as emergency frequencies or radar, or even between many 
of the commercial services (think of e.g. uses of unlicensed spectrum such as garage door openers 
and microwaves versus radio). On the other hand especially substitutability often occurs; a good 
example being TV versus radio broadcasts (unless one includes both of these under the wider term 
broadcasting, but it seems plausible to treat them as separate products).    
 
The number of sectors in the economy equals p and in each sector there are li (i=1,2,…,p) local 
markets similar to the one discussed previously in the core economic model. The assignment of 
spectrum is still constrained by the interference constraints discussed previously in 4.2.1. 
Transmitters are required by each local market and the transmitters within the markets are too close 
to each other to allow for spectrum (channel) sharing. Thus, returning to our previous discussion, 
each node in the graph represents a group of these kinds of transmitters as well as a local market. To 
further simplify the notation each (local) group of transmitters can be considered as one transmitter 
on one site. The spectrum allocation problem can be embedded in the following wider economic 
allocation problem (Levine & Rickman, 2007, p. 12-14). Note that we now discuss allocation 
instead of assignment since we have multiple sectors providing different services and thus varying 
allocations of spectrum are possible. This is a significant improvement to the original Smith-NERA 
method, which presupposed allocation and only allowed optimization of assignment of spectrum. 
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Firstly, the total demand for channels in each local market j=1,2,…,li for each sector i=1,2,…p is 
calculated. Due to independence of services across sectors, and assuming the same across markets, 
demand in a local market j of sector i will depend only on the price Pij, according to what was 
discussed previously in 4.2.2. Secondly, a social welfare function W is chosen to take the following 
form: 
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where Sij is the consumer surplus in market j of sector i given by: 
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R in turn is the revenue accrued to the regulator from access prices (license fees) and it naturally 
depends on the demand for channels as well as channel price, i.e. 
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1+Λ represents the cost of public funds where Λ>0 captures “the distortionary effects of taxes that 
would otherwise be required in the absence of this revenue (Levine & Rickman 2007, p.13)”. In 
other words Levine and Rickman include both the AIP payment (the actual spectrum usage fee) and 
the cost recovery fee in the access price a  and assume that without an access price the costs would 
be covered through taxation, which would have distortionary effects on social welfare. The right-
most term in (19) is naturally the producer surplus which consists of the profits earned by all firms 
across the economy. 
 
Alternatively (19) can be interpreted as the regulator’s (“social planner”) objective function 
incorporating any restrictions imposed by law. Since by UK and EU law spectrum should be priced 
according to spectrum management considerations (as discussed previously) instead of in order to 
raise taxes, it is implied that the revenue term should be ignored. Thus, Λ should equal -1. In the 
following analysis the revenue term is kept and Λ>0 or Λ= -1 substituted only after the optimization 
is completed. 
 
The social planner maximizes (19) with respect to access prices ija for each of the sectors and the 
markets within them (i=1,2,…,p and j=1,2,…,li), and the number of firms providing each service in 
each market Nj (j=1,p). The maximization is done subject to the engineering constraints discussed in 
4.2.1 and the spectrum resource constraint: 
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which simply states that the amount of spectrum allocated or assigned cannot exceed the total 
amount of spectrum available (implying scarcity of the resource). Since licenses are admitted to a 
limited number of firms contradicting the free entry condition discussed in 4.2.2 (while 
endogenizing N) the profits would not be driven to zero and they should be included in the welfare 
function as was done in (19).   
 
If however the regulator is not responsible for market structure (i.e. N is exogenously determined), 
(19) would be maximized with respect to only the equilibrium prices subject to the free entry 
equilibrium condition   
iijijij ljpiNa ,...,2,1;,...2,1;0),(   ,  (23) 
the engineering constraints of 4.2.1 and the spectrum resource constraint. 
 
In principle welfare maximization requires that in order to take into account the differing demands 
and cost conditions of different markets as well as the inter-market interference constraints, each 
market should have a unique spectrum price a . In practice this might be too strict a requirement, 
especially since the information needs (of the regulator setting the price) increase with increasingly 
individual prices for different markets. Thus, applying equal spectrum prices within a sector 
( iij aa  ) might be plausible – note that this was assumed previously as well while discussing the 
Smith-NERA method. This approach is further supported if there exists channel trading between 
markets, since restricting the possibility of arbitrage requires equal pricing. 
 
The number of firms in this framework varies across markets in each sector (and thus across 
sectors). These firms can be thought of as local operators, with each firm providing a service in a 
single market. An alternative the approach, which Levine and Rickman (2007) adopt, is that each 
firm is a network operator providing its service across all markets within the sector. Thus, in sector 
i and market j Nij=Ni holds. This assumption is adopted in the example discussed in 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. 
4.2.4 Optimal spectrum pricing with linear technology 
In this section the optimal network license price across sectors consisting of Ni network operators 
providing services across li local markets is studied. Before constructing the general case the 
optimization task is discussed with the help of an example where li=3 i.e. there exists three markets 
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within a sector i. With the help of this example the relationship between the interference constraints 
and firms’ pricing and channel use decisions is described. This discussion is further developed 
leading to determination of the optimal AIP payments and their dependence on spectrum sharing.  
 
Firms and markets are considered to be identical except for the interference constraints. The radio 
channels can be used in all li markets taking into account the interference constraints. Each channel 
holds a fixed license fee 
ia  payable to the regulator per unit of time (e.g. once a year). Due to the 
proximity of channels used within a local market, spectrum sharing is not possible within a local 
market, but may be possible between local markets (and thus sectors). 
 
As stated above, Levine and Rickman start with an example with sector i, which consists of three 
local markets (li=3). Thus, there are four interference graphs to consider with respect to such an 
example: two homogenous graphs and two inhomogenous graphs. For clarity these special cases are 
depicted with letters A and B respectively in this subsection. The two homogenous graphs consist 
of a complete graph with edges between every pair of nodes and a graph with no edges. These two 
cases are depicted in appendix 1. The two inhomogenous cases are a graph with one edge and a 
graph with two edges, which are depicted in appendix 2.   
 
The focus in this section is on the network operators’ pricing and output decisions made with 
respect to the license price. First this is examined within a particular sector and thus we drop the 
sector subscript i from the equations (sector-specific prices are discussed later on in this chapter). 
For simplicity the production function is specialized to equal: 
  qzKLq  ;)1(
1
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     (24) 
In other words, Levine and Rickman consider a linear technology for spectrum, for which spectrum 
is a pure complement, i.e. it cannot be substituted by capital or labor. Output q is thus produced 
using a Leontief technology with fixed proportions of inputs. For notational reasons units are 
chosen in a way that one radio channel is required for one unit of output and output capacity equals 
the number of channels available. This can be assumed without any loss of generality. 
 
Thus, a firm k producing an output of qkj in a particular local market j=1,2,3 requires a total of Zk  
radio channel licenses with Zk ≥ zkj ≥ qkj, where zkj are the channels available for firm k in market j, 
which will naturally depend on the nature of the interference graph (the four different cases of 
65 
spectrum sharing mentioned above). It is assumed that the license fee a  is independent of the firm’s 
location and the firm itself. 
 
The total costs for firm k can be expressed as: 
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where F represents the set-up costs or fixed costs of operations, 
kaZ the license fees paid and 
 
3
1j kj
qc the costs of producing the total output across the three markets, where c = (w,r) equals the 
cost function associated with the CES production function of labor and capital in (24).  
 
Again the regulator first sets the fee for a particular sector i and firms then compete in the market. 
By backward induction firm k chooses labor and capital to minimize the costs c(w,r)qkj of 
producing qkj in markets j=1,2,3 given the factor prices (w,r). Through this choice of units and the 
fixed proportions Leontief function the firm then knows its demand for channels; it requires qkj 
channels in market j, since it was assumed that one unit of production requires one channel. Prices 
for the end products equal Pj in each market j=1,2,3. The firm acquires a license for Zk channels at 
price a . According to the relevant interference graph the firm k is then able to utilize zkj ≤ Zk 
channels in market j with this license. In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in each market this firm then 
maximizes profits by choosing outputs qkj and channels Zk:   
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given the spectrum (channel) constraint 
kkjkj Zzq      (27) 
and the outputs kjq
~
 of the other firms in markets 1,2 and 3. The four cases with the four alternative 
interference graphs are considered next. 
 
A) Homogenous interference graphs 
 
Levine and Rickman start by introducing the cases with the two homogenous graphs i.e. the 
complete graph and the graph with no edges. An interference graph with no edges implies that all 
channels are available in each market and thus zkj=Zk. In other words it is assumed that all channels 
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can be shared. Define λj≥0 as the shadow price for the spectrum constraint (27). Then the firm k 
maximizes the Lagrangian: 
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with respect to output qkj, spectrum/channels Zk and λ given the decisions of other firms. 
Remembering the definition of profits Πk from (26) the first order conditions for j=1,2,3 are: 
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The first FOC equates the marginal return of providing q in each market with the shadow price of 
spectrum in that particular market. The second FOC describes the license fee a  as the shadow price 
of spectrum across the three markets i.e. correctly equating it with the network shadow price of the 
network operator. The third FOC simply states that if the spectrum constraint is not binding, i.e. 
there are no interference constraints and thus basically no scarcity in some market, the shadow 
value or price λj equals zero. This gives the Kuhn-Tucker complementary slackness conditions for 
each market.  
 
The above calculation implies the following solution. By symmetry λj= λ= a /3 > 0 and thus the 
constraints are binding. In addition, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium the Lerner price is given by: 
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Output is given by Q=AP
-ϵ
 (when D(P) = AP
-ɛ
) in each of the markets and profits by Π( a ,N) = (P – 
c - a  /3) Q/N – F per market as defined by (26). The number of firms N is, as was previously 
discussed, determined either by the free entry condition by which profits equal zero (Π( a , N) = 0) 
or through policies imposed by the regulator.  
 
The second homogenous case where all nodes are joined, i.e. there is no possibility for channel 
sharing between markets, is quite similar to the no-edges case. Given Zk there are now zkj=Zk/3 
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channels available per market. Through an analysis similar to that above the price in each market 
becomes: 
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It is noteworthy that this equilibrium price is higher than in (32). Thus, since channel sharing does 
not exist across markets and firms cannot share the costs of spectrum, the corresponding 
equilibrium price for the end products and services increases. Proposition 1 stating that profits 
decrease with increases in a  or N also implies that now profits are lower than in the previous case 
and less firms will enter the market in free entry equilibrium. 
 
B) Inhomogenous interference graphs 
 
Levine and Rickman then move on to discuss the two inhomogenous cases where spectrum sharing 
is partially restricted; the graph with two edges and the graph with one edge. These cases are of 
more interest since they imply differing prices between markets due to differing interference 
constraints. Thus, they resemble the actual market conditions for markets utilizing spectrum better 
than the homogenous cases; as we discussed in chapter 2 previously the demand and thus 
congestion between spectrum bands (i.e. here markets or sectors offering different services) differ 
implying different restrictions on usage and spectrum sharing. 
 
Let us start with the graph with two edges as depicted in appendix 2 on the right. The markets 
j=1,2,3 are located in the three nodes marked with A,B and C.  The form of the interference graph 
now indicates that markets B and C are able to share channels, but sharing is otherwise restricted. 
Thus, if we first assume that for a firm k, i.e. a network operator operating in all of the markets 
j=1,2,3, all Zk channels are available in market 1 (=A) and qk1 of  them are used, then zk2 = zk3 = Zk1-
qk1 are available in markets 2 (=B) and 3(=C). When making its production decisions as well 
decisions on how much to require spectrum resources firm k maximizes a Lagrangian: 
 
)()()( 13312211 kkkkkkkkkk qZqqZqZqL    (34) 
 
with respect to qkj, Zk and λk given the corresponding choices of other firms. Thus, the first order 
conditions are: 
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Since market 1 releases spectrum resources to be used in the two other markets the spectrum 
constraint (CS) for market 1 does not bind and λ1=0. Spectrum is fully utilized in markets 2 and 3 so 
that λ2, λ3>0. Following the same reasoning as before, in symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria the 
equilibrium prices become: 
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It is noteworthy that the prices Pj are lower in markets where spectrum sharing is possible i.e. 
P2=P3<P1. This is logical since the firms can share costs of spectrum use across these markets. 
Comparing these prices to the equilibrium prices attained in sectors with homogenous graphs 
reveals that the price is the lowest with full spectrum sharing (the first case discussed, an 
interference graph with no edges), mostly due to the same reason of cost sharing across markets. 
Compared to a sector with full-edge interference graphs with no spectrum sharing the prices are 
lower in the markets allowing spectrum sharing (2 and 3), but according to proposition 1 profits will 
initially be higher. This is due to the reason that spectrum sharing allows for lower license fee a  , 
which in turn increases the profits earned by the spectrum users (firms). Thus, in a less congested 
sector (in the radio interference sense) more firms will enter the market attracted by the higher 
profits making the market more competitive (Levine & Rickman 2007, p.18).   
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We now move on to discussing a sector with an interference graph with one edge as depicted in 
appendix 2 on the left. The markets j=1,2,3 are again located in nodes A,B and C.  The form of the 
interference graph now indicates that markets A and B as well as A and C are able to share 
channels, but sharing is restricted between markets B and C. For a firm k all Zk channels are 
available in market 1 (=A) implying Zk = zk1. These available channels A can be shared in markets 2 
and 3, but not between markets 2 and 3, and thus zk2 = zk3 =Z/2. The Lagrangian to be maximized 
with respect to qkj, Zk and λk, given other firms’ actions, by firm k now takes the form: 
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In the familiar way the FOC’s are the following: 
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Levine and Rickman first solve for type Ι equilibrium where all the spectrum resource constraints 
bind (λj>0, j=1,2,3). Firstly, by symmetry of markets B and C it must hold that λ2= λ3. Based on the 
FOC’s the solution must then satisfy: 
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Solving for P1,P2, λ1 and λ2 we get: 


















N
ac
P
1
1
2
)21(
1
1     (50) 
70 
                                    



















N
ac
PP
1
1
2
)21(
2
32
    (51) 
                                             





21
)21(
1
ac
     (52) 
                                     
)21(
))(12(
32 




ca
     (53) 
 
From λ2 = λ3 > 0 we get ϵ >1, which was previously imposed. In addition, λ1 > 0 requires that the 
license price a  satisfies the following:   
)12(  ca     (54) 
If the condition provided by (54) does not hold we have a type ΙΙ equilibrium where the spectrum 
capacity constraint for market 1 does not bind i.e. λ1 = 0 meaning that there exist spare spectrum 
channels. In that case the pricing decisions in the optimum satisfy: 
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The results given above emphasize the relationship between interference constraints, license fees 
and the pricing and channel usage decisions of firms. If and only if the regulator imposes a 
sufficiently high license fee (AIP) so that (54) holds, all channels will be in full utilization in each 
market (Levine and Rickman 2007, p.20). Thus, Levine and Rickman’s analysis clearly implies that 
in order to guarantee technical efficiency a sufficiently high AIP is needed; preventing any firm 
from acquiring a license and still leaving the spectrum un- or underutilized. On the other hand, 
prices are increased directly through the effect of the of the license fee on retail Lerner index 
(measuring market power) and indirectly through increased concentration of competition in a free-
entry equilibrium. This in turn verifies that neither too high AIP payments impair overall welfare as 
well by decreasing consumer surplus. 
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The framework above can be extended by developing software capable of handling larger problems, 
but the small node number examples considered are sufficient in identifying the key issues behind 
AIP payments and their effects on market outcomes, which we will continue studying next. Levine 
and Rickman (2007, p.20) especially state that these examples demonstrate that the “spatially 
distributed aspects of channel assignment problems provide new challenges for analysis that go 
beyond standard economic treatments.”  
4.2.4.1 Optimal AIP 
 
In the analysis above the sector subscript i was dropped since only a single sector with three local 
markets was considered. Next Levine and Rickman move on to discuss the regulator’s choice of an 
optimal price for a particular sector i, i.e. sector-specific prices are introduced. The equilibrium 
concept considered is the free entry equilibrium and thus firms enter the market until profits are 
driven to zero. For analytical convenience only cases with homogenous graphs are considered, but 
instead of li=3 the case is generalized to account for any number of local markets li in sector i. As 
previously, the firms act as network operators providing a homogenous service across the local 
markets within the sector. It is however noteworthy that with homogenous graphs (no or full 
spectrum sharing) this is equivalent to assuming local operators: if we let a
L
 be the licence price for 
local operators and put a = la
L
 we arrive at an identical optimization problem described below 
(Levine & Rickman 2007, p.20). Within a sector i the Ni network operators are identical and they 
demand Zi spectrum channels at a license price ia to be determined here. The revenue for the 
regulator in sector i is thus iii aZN  and in case of homogenous graphs, as was shown previously, 
the retail prices are identical across markets in a particular sector i, i.e. Pij=Pi. Remembering the 
welfare function (19) previously and the definition for the consumer surplus Sij in (20) as well as 
the fact that due to homogeneity of the interference constraints symmetry between markets requires 
Sij=Si, the regulator’s problem set out in general form becomes: 
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and the interference constraints given by the graphs. 
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Since the analysis is restricted to homogenous graphs there are two types of relevant sectors: the 
ones with li nodes (local markets) all connected to each other, i.e. sectors without any spectrum 
sharing or re-use and those with full spectrum sharing. For the sectors without the re-use property 
the demand for spectrum is given by )( iiiii PDlZN   and based on the previous analysis the retail 
price is given by 
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. For sectors with spectrum sharing the equivalent demand is 
determined by )( iiii PDZN   and the retail price by 
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. If we define ki=1 for sectors 
without re-use and ki=1/li for sectors with re-use, the welfare maximization problem (58) can be 
written as: 
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The regulator now maximizes (60) with respect to the spectrum prices (a vector) ),...,( 21 paaaa   
subject to the interference constraints and the resource constraint  
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The interference constraints state that due to their (geographical) proximity channels cannot be 
shared within a local market but a firm, i.e. a network operator, can share channels between markets 
in a given sector provided that this sector supports channel sharing (i.e. ki=1/li). Channel sharing 
between sectors is assumed to be prohibited by international harmonization agreements. In other 
words, certain channels are by agreement allocated to a certain use (i.e. sector, such as mobile 
communications), which cannot vary.  This is often the case in reality as well; remember the 
discussion in chapter 3.1 regarding the often pre-determined or internationally coordinated nature of 
spectrum uses leaving only the assignment to be determined by the (national) regulators. 
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The regulator then assigns channels to each firm within different sectors. Taking the license price as 
given firms compete by making entry and exit decisions. This results in a retail price for each sector 
given by (61).  The regulator’s optimization problem is given by a Lagrangian: 
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where μ as the resource constraint multiplier represents the shadow value of spectrum. If we write 
the retail price (61) as ))(,( iiiii aNaPP  , the first order condition with respect to the spectrum 
price ia  optimized by the regulator equals: 
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On the left-hand-side of (64) the first term depicts the negative impact (marginal cost) of a 
(marginal) increase in spectrum license fee on consumer surplus through increased  retail prices 
(given that 0
da
dP
 ) and the second term captures the positive effect (marginal benefit) the change 
in ia  has on welfare through increased revenues. On the right-hand-side we have the marginal cost 
of spectrum evaluated at its shadow price μ. Levine and Rickman (2007, p.22) point out, that the 
expression for the optimal AIP in each sector does not depend on conditions of other sectors, but 
only on the sector-specific  demand and supply conditions as well as the shadow price of spectrum. 
This is due to the assumed independence of sectors, i.e. services between sectors are neither 
substitutes nor complements as was previously imposed. Note that the value of the shadow price 
reflects spectrum scarcity: μ > 0 suggests scarcity exists whereas μ = 0 implies there is no shortage 
of spectrum.  
 
Next Levine and Rickman proceed to evaluate 
ii dadP using the free-entry condition 
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as calculated in more detail in appendix 3. Thus differentiating ))(,( iiiii aNaPP  with respect to 
ia  gives: 
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On the right-hand-side we have the direct effect of license price changes on retail price 
accompanied with the indirect effect caused by the firms exiting the market as the cost of acquiring 
and holding spectrum increases. Solving the free-entry condition for the number of firms Ni and 
differentiating it with respect to the spectrum price in turn gives (for ϵ >1 assumed throughout the 
analysis): 
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which is in accordance with what was discussed earlier; increasing operational costs (license fees) 
drive some firms out of business thus decreasing the number of firms in a given sector (Ni) and 
establishing a negative connection between license fees and the number of firms. 
 
Substituting this into the previous equation (66) we arrive at: 
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where ρi is defined as 
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In other words, the size of i  is dependent on the number of firms and the price elasticity of 
demand (of the end products). From (69) it can be seen that as the number of firms tends towards 
infinity ( iN ), i  approaches unity. Given iN  and letting ϵi vary between one and infinity, i.e. 
ϵ   ,1 , then it must hold that i 
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Dividing the FOC 0/ idadL in (64) by the demand )( ii PD  and remembering the basic definition 
for the elasticity of demand  
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This equation along with the free-entry condition, where profits are driven to zero: 
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The Kuhn-Tucker complementary slackness conditions: 
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and the retail price equation previously stated in (61): 
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determine the four equations for iii PaN ,,  and i  at the optimum, given the parameters iii kc ,, and 
iA . This completes the solution for the optimal license price.  
 
Although this method by Levine and Rickman gives a more sophisticated solution to determining 
AIP than any of the alternative methods suggested (see 4.1. and 4.3) it also imposes heavy 
information requirements for the regulator responsible for such a task. Namely, the price elasticity 
of demand, information on cost properties of firms within the market as well as accurate knowledge 
of the interference constraints must be possessed in order to solve such an optimization problem. 
 
The first order condition (70) highlights an important result, which connects the optimal license 
price to the amount of congestion captured by ki.  It suggests that given the number of firms Ni, as 
congestion (measured by ki) increases the optimal license fee (AIP) decreases and )( ii Na shifts 
downwards. In addition, from the retail price equation (61) it is evident that congestion increases 
the retail price (or spectrum price per unit of output) so that the downward-sloping free-entry 
relationship )(aN i  depicted in appendix 4 shifts to the left. This result is summarized by Levine 
and Rickman (2007, p.24) as 
 
Proposition 3: 
Assuming linear technology for spectrum and homogeneous interference graphs, ceteris paribus the 
optimal license fee (AIP) in sectors without spectrum sharing (i.e. re-use) is lower than that in 
sectors with spectrum sharing.  
 
In other words, proposition three states that the constraint on spectrum sharing does not imply any 
“congestion tax” with the form of an increased license price. Levine and Rickman (2007, p.24) 
explain this perhaps counter-intuitive result in the following way. A higher license price is not 
necessary to reduce demand of spectrum in areas without spectrum re-use (or sharing) since firms 
do this themselves through increasing the retail prices. This is illustrated in the examples in 
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appendices 5 and 6, of which 5 describes the situation where spectrum is scarce (i.e. the shadow 
value of spectrum μ > 0) and 6 the situation without spectrum scarcity (μ=0)22. With scarcity the 
retail price increases as ki reflecting the congestion level rises from ki=1/li for an interference graph 
without edges (full spectrum sharing allowed) to ki=1 for graphs with full edges (no channel sharing 
allowed).  
 
The issue presented above can be further explained with a help of an example. Let the number of 
local markets in a given sector be five i.e. li=5.Then we have ki=1/5 in the sector with spectrum 
sharing and ki=1 for sectors without it. If spectrum is scarce (μ > 0, the figure in appendix 5) 
comparing the first with the second shows that in the illustrative example the retail price more than 
doubles and the number of firms drops from approximately 5 to 3. Thus spectrum sharing allows for 
more firms to enter the market increasing competition. The regulator is naturally equally concerned 
with the welfare of both of these sectors and mitigates the effect of increasing market power (and 
thus increasing retail prices) by lowering the license price in the sector without spectrum sharing 
relative to the one with spectrum sharing. The previously discussed regulator’s strive for equality 
(between consumers in each market) can be seen here; without the mitigation the spectrum license 
fee would further increase retail prices in the more concentrated market decreasing consumer 
surplus relative to the more competitive market.  
 
If there is no scarcity of spectrum resources (μ=0, the figure in appendix 6), equation (70) implies 
that ii ka  and thus the retail price in (61) is independent from ki. The free-entry condition (71) 
further implies that this is also true for the number of firms Ni. This is depicted in the figure by the 
horizontal lines for the retail price P and the number of firms N. Thus, it must be that a i is only 
proportional to 1/ki, which is also depicted in the figure in appendix 6.  
 
Furthermore, if Ni increases substantially implying increased competition from (69) we get 1  
and (70) becomes 
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22
 These illustrative examples have been defined in a way that the baseline parameter values equal: ci = Ai = 1, Λ= 0,3, 
ϵi= 2 and li = 3. Fixed entry costs Fi are chosen so that at baseline parameter values in sectors without spectrum re-use 
(ki = 3), Ni = 4 (Levine & Rickman 2007, p.24). 
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and thus for Λ > 0, i.e. when taxes are regarded as distortionary, 0
i
i
d
da
. This can also be seen 
in the figure in appendix 7, and in the numerical example this seems to hold also for smaller Ni. In 
other words, the inverse relationship between the license fee and elasticity of demand implies that 
the spectrum license fee acts as a Ramsey price. The result is summarized in the following 
proposition (Levine & Rickman 2007, p.25): 
 
Proposition 4.  
For large Ni the optimal spectrum fee acts as a Ramsey tax across the sectors. In other words, the 
optimal AIP in a sector is inversely related to the elasticity of demand. Based on a numerical 
analysis this may also hold for small Ni. This result presupposes Λ > 1, i.e. that taxes have 
distortionary effects.  
 
If however Λ = 0 implying that there are no distortionary effects from taxation, the optimal license 
fee equals the shadow value of spectrum ia , and is thus independent of any sector-specific 
features. 
As was discussed previously, the (national) regulator is in many ways constrained by international 
harmonization and other regulations. So far we have assumed that license fees affect the total 
welfare positively by increasing the “revenue term” in (19). The situation may however be such that 
the regulator is by law constrained to ignore these benefits; for example laws forbidding any kind of 
revenue-raising objectives of AIP might constrain the regulator in this way. The general framework 
by Levin and Rickman handles this by assuming Λ = -1 in (19). When Ni is large (the competitive 
case) (73) becomes 
i
i
ii
k
c
a       (74) 
In this case the relationship between optimal AIP and the elasticity of demand is reversed. Also the 
relationship between the spectrum re-use parameter ki and optimal AIP is the opposite to what was 
discussed in propositions 3 and 4. The results are thus heavily dependent on revenue generation 
considerations. This is summarized as (Levine & Rickman 2007, p.26): 
 
Proposition 5 
If welfare benefits of revenue collection through AIP payments are ignored due to legal or other 
reasons, the constrained optimal license fee in sectors without spectrum re-use is greater. For large 
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Ni, the optimal AIP in sectors allowing spectrum re-use is positively related to the elasticity of 
demand. 
 
It is important to note that given proposition 5, the optimal AIP is interdependent on things usually 
beyond the control of any national regulator. Unless there is true international coordination between 
national and international telecommunication bodies, the level of welfare maximization that a 
national regulator can achieve while considering spectrum allocation, assignment and the possibility 
of AIP payments is restricted. The results regarding proposition 5 are graphically depicted in 
appendices 8 and 9.  
4.2.4.2 Incorporation of Costs of Adjusting Licence Prices 
 
As was discussed in subchapter 4.1, the Smith-NERA method of calculating AIP payments views 
the license fee formation as an incremental process. It suggests that the AIP payments need to be 
checked and altered in response to changes in opportunity costs caused by altered allocations of 
spectrum resources as well as due to technical development. Thus, only over time can the optimal 
solution (or a solution sufficiently near to the optimum) in allocation of spectrum be achieved. 
Levine and Rickman (2007) include this property in their model by introducing costs for adjusting 
the license prices.  In this way the optimization problem becomes dynamic (instead of static).  
 
The vector of optimal AIP payments solving the static problem set out previously is given by *a . 
Now Levine and Rickman consider an intertemporal welfare loss function: 
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where β ϵ (0,1] is the discount factor and  a parameter representing the cost of adjustment towards 
the optimum ( *ia in a given sector or *a  for the economy as a whole). The term ii aa *  naturally 
expresses the distance from the optimum at any given time. Equation (75) can be interpreted in the 
following way (Levine and Rickman 2007, p. 26). The regulator would like to be at the static 
optimum with an optimal set of prices for all sectors. However, as the attainment of the optimum is 
an iterative process towards this optimum, the regulator faces costs of changing prices, which are 
proportional to 2))(( ta , where )1()()(  tatata iii  expresses the change in the AIP payment 
over a time interval [t-1,t] in sector i. As 0 , this problem approaches the static optimization 
problem discussed above, where the regulator jumps to the static optimum right away, i.e. *aa  .  
79 
 
At t=1 the regulator minimizes the welfare loss Ω with respect to the license prices a  given 
historical prices )0(a . The first order condition is expressed as: 
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If the deviation of the current license )(tai fee from the static optimum *ia  
is denoted by )(tai
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, equation (76) can be written as 
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which is a second-order difference equation of )(tai

. To solve this z-transforms are taken to get the 
characteristic equation: 
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This second order equation has two positive roots, z1 < 1 and z2 > 1 and thus the system is saddle-
path stable with a solution: 
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The adjustment process for a specific sector is illustrated with a numerical example in appendix 10. 
In this example the optimal AIP is assumed to equal unity ( 1* ia ) and the starting point is at zero 
( 0)0( ia ). The example shows that the lower the adjustment costs the quicker the adjustment to 
the optimum. The optimization problem with adjustment costs illustrates the actions of a rational 
regulator, who adjusts the license fee towards the optimum with the speed of transition depending 
on the level of adjustment costs. This can be paralleled with the adjustment process described by the 
Smith-NERA method, where adjustments were to be made gradually.  
4.2.5 Optimal pricing with general technology  
 
In 4.2.4 the production technology was assumed to be linear restricting substitutability between 
spectrum resources and other factors of production. This was mainly done for reasons of 
tractability. As this may be too strict a restriction in reality, Levine and Rickman (2007) also set out 
the pricing regime with more general technology, which allows for substitution between spectrum 
and other inputs. In this way production function such as (3) or (4) depicted earlier can be 
considered. 
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The total costs of producing output qi in sector i with a spectrum license fee ia  become: 
iiiiiiiiii qakrwcFaqC ),,(),(     (80) 
F again represents the fixed (or the set-up) costs and ci the costs per unit of output, where ii ak  is the 
effective cost of spectrum for firms. When these costs are minimized with respect to the license 
price, by Shephard’s Lemma we end up with the demand for spectrum in sector i: 
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The regulator’s optimization problem for linear technology given by (60) and (62) can be 
generalized as:  
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with respect to license prices a  subject to the resource constraint  
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and the interference constraints given by the interference graphs. In (84) the retail price is naturally 
given by  
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To be able to perform the procedure a production function for the service utilizing spectrum or the 
cost function (80) is needed.  Even in that case the FOC’s are not analytically tractable as was the 
case with a linear production function, and they would require a numerical solution. Thus, the 
solution to the problem with general technology is left here by Levine and Rickman (2007). It is 
however noteworthy that important information regarding the setup of optimal AIP is still achieved 
as was brought forward by the analysis; especially the propositions 1-5 and the group of equations 
(70-72 and 62 restated) providing the solution for optimal AIP in case of linear technology. In the 
next section we move on to discuss and compare the alternative approaches of determining AIP 
discussed above. 
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4.2.6 Critique and comparisons to the Smith-NERA method 
 
This section draws comparisons between the different approaches for determining the optimal AIP 
payment discussed in the previous sections 4.1 and 4.2, and discusses the benefits and pitfalls of 
each of them. For notational purposes the approach developed by Smith and NERA (1996) and 
further enhanced by Indepen et al. (2007) is referred to as the Smith-NERA method and the 
approach proposed by Levine and Rickman (2007) the L-R method. As the Smith-NERA method’s 
limitations were already discussed in detail in 4.1.3 this section concentrates on comparing the two 
methods. In addition, this section reflects on the key ways in which the L-R method accounts for 
some of the issues identified in Smith-NERA and what pitfalls may still remain. 
 
First of all, the Smith-NERA approach can be made comparable to the L-R method by stating it as 
follows (Levine & Rickman 2007, p.28-31): Assume again as in Smith-NERA that there are two 
sectors in the economy, i.e. in the L-R context p=2. The cost function per unit of input qi  is given by  
 
2,1);,,(),,(),,(),,(  iarwaZarwrKarwwLarwc iiii   (86) 
 
If no constraints are imposed on firms regarding the inputs they can use then (86) represent the 
minimum costs chosen by firms given input prices (w,r,a). However, assume that the license fee is 
too low to clear the market in a way that that there exists at least one firm which lacks the spectrum 
to achieve the minimum costs. In other words, excessively low pricing of frequency resources leads 
to significant excess demand, which cannot all be satisfied by the current, limited amount of the 
resource.  
 
Assume that firm 1 lacks spectrum whereas firm 2 is unconstrained. If we then consider a small 
incremental increase in spectrum for firm 1, ∆Z1, which the firm substitutes for labor ∆L1 and 
capital ∆K1 the change in cost is given by  
 
01 111  ZaKrLwc    (87) 
 
and for the unconstrained firm the change in cost equals 
 
02222  ZaKrLwc    (88) 
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knowing that  ∆Z2 =  - ∆Z1 and firm 2 has minimized costs before the re-allocation. The absolute 
value 1c  represents the opportunity cost discussed in the Smith-NERA methodology. This value 
represents what the society forgoes by allocating spectrum to sector 2 rather than sector 1. As was 
discussed earlier, the opportunity cost estimates are based on costs of alternative uses for spectrum 
resources. In this way the Smith-NERA ideology can be stated in terms of the L-R methodology as 
well.  
 
We can now move on to conclusively discuss the key strengths and weaknesses of the methods. The 
obvious benefit of the Smith-NERA method is its simplicity; the concept of opportunity cost is easy 
to understand and communicate to regulators as well as firms to which the spectrum license fee is 
applied.  In addition, there already exist some estimates for these costs, as the methodology has 
been applied in some countries (namely the UK and New Zealand, see e.g. the reports by Ofcom). 
Naturally these costs are for a particular point in time with certain spectrum allocations, but they 
can be used as a benchmark when adjusting the AIP payment.   
 
As already discussed in 4.1.3 and above, the Smith-NERA method however has several 
shortcomings. The key issues have to do with market structure (assumes perfect markets), the 
models accountancy for interference (does not explicitly take these constraints into account), 
restrictions on allocation vs. assignment of frequencies (presupposes allocation forgoing significant 
efficiency gains) and emphasizing private surplus (omits e.g. the effect of revenue generation for 
the government and on welfare).  
 
In the L-R method the AIP construction is regarded as the regulator’s optimization problem: the 
regulator maximizes overall welfare consisting of consumer surplus, producer surplus and the 
revenue streams for the government (i.e. society), with respect to the spectrum fee a  given the 
interference and resource constraints. Thus, the model takes into account total welfare and the 
scarcity imposed congestion of spectrum resources.  
 
In addition, the L-R model accounts for market structure by, rather than perfect markets, assuming 
several oligopolistic markets and sectors within a given economy. A crucial property in the L-R 
model is also that it allows for re-allocations of spectrum since, as was discussed earlier already in 
the introduction of the thesis, re-allocation to more optimal uses (in view of economic efficiency) 
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may offer significant efficiency improvement compared to or in addition to re-assigning spectrum 
to users in a way that the user valuing the frequency most gets the license. 
 
Both the Smith-NERA and L-R method include dynamic aspects agreeing that setting the AIP to its 
optimal level is dependent on the point of time and place as well as the surrounding circumstances 
at that time, such as the level of technical advancement. Changes in allocation of spectrum also 
change the underlying calculation assumptions of AIP and thus the optimal AIP varies in time and 
should be re-evaluated whenever the circumstances change. However, neither one of the approaches 
explicitly discusses how AIP may be used to ensure dynamic efficiency, i.e. encouraging innovation 
and especially investments in spectrum-efficient technologies. Both methods bring about 
improvements compared to the pure administrative methods, which do not impose price on 
frequencies implying significant economic rents for firms utilizing them and undermining the 
guiding effect the pricing may have on economic efficiency through allocating the resources to 
agents valuing them the most. 
 
Although the method by Levine and Rickman gives a more sophisticated solution to determining 
AIP than any of the alternative methods suggested (see 4.1. and the upcoming chapter 4.3) it also 
imposes heavy information requirements for the regulator responsible for such a task. Namely, the 
price elasticity of demand, information on cost properties of firms within the market as well as 
accurate knowledge of the interference constraints must be possessed in order to solve such an 
optimization problem. In addition to this, the method proposed by Levine and Rickman is more 
complicated than Smith-NERA to apply in practice requiring significant computational power in 
order for the larger real life problems (with more than just three local markets to consider). 
 
A further limitation of the model by Levine and Rickman can be stated to be omitting any 
considerations for strategic bidding among the spectrum users; a phenomenon often seen in real life 
and carefully accounted for e.g. in the auction literature. However, if we were to assume that policy 
measures, that are not explicitly captured by the model but which still exist in the  market setting to 
which the model is embedded, take into account or restrict such strategic bidding the model remains 
evermore relevant. 
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4.3 AIP payments based on market transactions 
 
AIP payments have also been suggested to be based on realized market transactions, i.e. auction 
prices or trading prices from the secondary markets when such are available. Applying market 
transaction prices is naturally straightforward and compared to the two alternatives for determining 
AIP presented in this thesis (subchapters 4.1 and 4.2) requires only moderate effort from the 
regulator’s part in terms of price and relevance determination. 
 
Using realized market transactions as a basis for AIP is however troublesome since there have been 
quite few market transactions and, as was pointed out earlier, no country has implemented a fully 
functioning free market for spectrum. Auction prices for same frequencies across different countries 
and markets vary significantly (nearly all national regulators collect and report the results of 
national auctions, but for a cross-country comparisons see e.g. Rayal
23
), which suggests that 
spectrum value is highly dependent on market structure as well as restrictions and conditions 
imposed in an auction. Thus, applicability across geographical borders is likely to be weak.  
 
In addition, independent of market structure, the results of market transactions may be distorted for 
other reasons, such as the previously discussed concept of winner’s curse, due to which the licensee 
may end up paying a significant premium on the actual value of the frequency. Imposing absurdly 
high AIP payments in turn may result in frequencies remaining completely unused. A fitting 
example of this is the 3G licenses granted by the national regulator Comisión del Mercado de las 
Telecomunicaciones (CMT) in Spain in March 2000, where the licenses were granted using beauty 
contest combined with AIP like payment that were imposed on the licenses. The regulator used the 
previous 3G auction results (pricing) from the United Kingdom Germany as benchmarks for setting 
the fees. As a result it was later on forced to lower the amount of the annual incentive payments as 
they no longer reflected the valuation of spectrum after the IT bubble had burst (ITU News 
Magazine, 2003). 
 
Discrepancy between the private value of spectrum (according to which possible licensees bid in an 
auction) and social value for the entire society may further distort market transaction prices making 
them non-optimal as the basis for AIP. As there are also several constraints and pitfalls in 
determining AIP payments based on administrative judgment by the regulator, the realized 
                                                 
23
Frank Rayal:  http://frankrayal.com/2012/11/06/summary-of-select-spectrum-auction-results/ 
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transaction prices can and should, however, be used as benchmarks for spectrum value, constructed 
using a more fine-tuned approach (such as the ones presented previously in this chapter) 
 
Chapter 4 introduced the different methods that exist in determining AIP payments. These include 
the core method, called the Smith-NERA method, based on pricing at the level of opportunity cost,  
a method  by Levine and Rickman (2007) which extends the Smith-NERA methodology to account 
for market structure and interference constraints, and a method which bases AIP payments on prices 
realized in market transactions. 
 
The different methods were shown to impose very differing informational requirements for the 
regulator responsible for setting the AIP with the method by Levine and Rickman requiring most 
sophisticated knowledge whereas also giving most accurate estimates of welfare maximizing 
spectrum fees. The method by Levine and Rickman was shown to be a regulator’s optimization 
problem where the regulator maximizes overall welfare with respect to the spectrum fee given the 
interference and resource constraints at the same time accounting for many of the limitations of the 
Smith-NERA model. Spectrum fees based on realized market prices were shown to be good only 
for benchmarking, not to be used for AIP determination as such due to their dependence on market 
characteristics and  thus poor replicability across geographical or segment borders. The final chapter 
5 summarizes the thesis and its main conclusions as well as makes suggestions for further studies. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to offer an overview on spectrum management methods and to 
provide a detailed analysis of one of them, namely the Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP). AIP 
is a pricing mechanism utilized in connection with administrative spectrum allocation and 
assignment methods to promote efficient use of spectrum. This section summarizes the key points 
in each previous chapter and draws conclusions on the applicability and formation of AIP as well as 
introduces possibilities for further studies. 
 
Our society is becoming more and more wireless and in many other ways dependent on applications 
and services utilizing frequencies as inputs of production. Despite the growing demand and thus 
significance of spectrum resources in the society, as well as the vast economic benefits optimal 
utilization of such resource may bring, there have been very few new approaches to spectrum 
management during the last couple of decades. Traditional division and pricing methods such as 
beauty contests and auctions still dominate academic research. Given the scarcity of spectrum 
resources this should be an issue on every communication regulator’s priority list.   
 
Frequencies are managed and governed through a combination of international (e.g. ITU), multi-
national or regional (e.g. the EU) and national authorities (national communications regulators such 
as MINTC in Finland). The need for spectrum management stems from the externality of 
interference, which imposes restrictions on spectrum usage. The main objective of spectrum 
management, alongside securing national safety and public interests, is efficient use of spectrum 
resources. Efficiency in the spectrum context is defined as economic efficiency, which can be 
shown to include the concepts of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. 
 
Currently used spectrum management methods can be divided into three distinct categories, namely 
the administrative methods, i.e. lotteries, first-come-first-serve methods and beauty contests, 
market-based methods, i.e. auctions and secondary markets for spectrum, as well as the newer 
approaches of AIP, the viewpoint of frequencies as natural resources and the special case of 
unlicensed spectrum. Traditional assignment methods rely completely on the regulator to assign the 
frequency resources, without any market driven processes involved. As such they impose no price 
on frequencies (although it is common for the regulators to impose small cost recovery fees), but 
can be combined with pricing schemes such as the AIP. Market based methods in turn primarily 
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rely on market processes to equalize supply and demand. The methods termed as new pursue to 
either find fundamental ways of treating and regulating spectrum differently than before (spectrum 
as a natural resource and unlicensed spectrum) or to complement more traditional methods in order 
to enhance efficiency of the resource use (AIP). 
 
With respect to economic efficiency the market-based methods are preferred as they include 
bidding for the scarce resource and impose a price on spectrum. However, in some situations 
market based or even market mimicking methods (such as the AIP) cannot be utilized or other 
objectives than economic efficiency necessitate the use of other methods; the most important case 
being unlicensed spectrum, which existence is claimed to encourage innovation increasing dynamic 
efficiency. Auctioning can be shown to be preferred for high demand and value frequencies under 
competitive settings whereas AIP can also be utilized in connection with administrative assignment 
methods. It can also be used for public service frequencies, which traditionally have not been priced 
or subjected to any competitive bidding. As AIP is an annual (and changeable) fee imposed on 
spectrum users it effectively pushes spectrum users (firms) to regard spectrum as any other input of 
production when making production decisions. Auctioning fees in turn are imposed as a lump sum 
fee and thus may be regarded as sunk cost by the firms with weaker guiding effects from the 
viewpoint of the regulator. 
 
Independent of the management methods used, the regulator is often bound to face a contradiction 
between private and social value of spectrum. Private spectrum value can be broken down into 
project and defensive values (forming the total returns from spectrum usage) and the option value. 
This private value in turn is likely to divert from the social value of spectrum whenever market 
distortions are present. Thus, the regulators’ task often consists of counterbalancing somewhat 
contradictory objectives while also ensuring that efficiency is pursued. 
 
When determining an optimal amount of AIP, the regulators currently have three methodologies at 
their disposal. The fee is usually based on the opportunity cost of spectrum use, since it is regarded 
to be a clear, relatively easily attainable measure in line with efficient outcomes, at least under 
perfect competition assumptions. The core method, called the Smith-NERA method is based on this 
principle. However, there are also two alternative ways proposed to calculate the optimal price; a 
method by Levine and Rickman (2007) which extends the Smith-NERA methodology to account 
for market structure and interference constraints, and a method which bases AIP payments on prices 
realized in market transactions. 
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First of all, the advantages and pitfalls of basing AIP payments on market transaction data are 
relatively straightforward. Applying this method is limited by the fact that there have been quite few 
market transactions and no country has implemented a fully functioning free market for spectrum. 
In other words, there is a lack of relevant pricing information to base the AIP estimates on. In 
addition, spectrum value is likely to be highly dependent on market structure as well as restrictions 
and conditions imposed in auctions implying weak applicability of results across geographies or 
sectors. All the downsides of auctioning are also at play hindering the use of realized transaction 
prices as anything more than benchmarks against AIP fees determined through more refined 
methods. Such downsides include overpaying for the auctioned resources (the winners curse), as 
well as the discrepancy between private value (according to which bids are submitted in auctions) 
and social value or the value maximizing overall welfare. 
  
The two more refined models of determining AIP introduced in this thesis are of various degrees of 
complexity. The Smith-NERA model relies on opportunity costs and in its most simplistic form 
proposes license prices to be based on available estimates of the costs of alternative uses of the 
radio spectrum. Thus, in this relatively straightforward procedure the regulator first needs to 
identify the next best use/user for the spectrum resource and then determine the alternatives that the 
next best user has if denied the frequency input. Out of the possible alternatives the least expensive 
one is regarded as the alternative cost for spectrum. The model by Levine and Rickman in turn is a 
combination of economic modelling and information theory (in particular graph theory), which 
essentially treats the AIP formation as a welfare optimization problem. In such an optimization 
problem the regulator maximizes overall welfare consisting of consumer surplus, producer surplus 
and the revenue streams for the government with respect to the spectrum fee given the interference 
and resource constraints. When solved, the model gives a group of equations determining optimal 
AIP (see 4.2.4.1) assuming linear technology. The same can be repeated for general technology, but 
it requires computational power and is not analytically tractable (i.e. can only be shown with a 
numerical example). Key conclusions of the model by Levine and Rickman regarding optimal AIP 
can be summarized as follows: In a setting where interference, market structure and overall welfare 
including consumer and producer surplus as well as the revenue impact for the government from 
imposing AIP, the optimal AIP should be higher whenever spectrum sharing is possible and that it 
acts as Ramsey tax across sectors of the economy being inversely related to the elasticity of 
demand.  
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Based on the research and studies discussed in this thesis (especially  Smith-NERA 1996; Indepen 
et al. 2004; Cave, Doyle and Webb 2007; Levine and Rickman 2007; Doyle 2007 and 2010; Aegis 
and Plum 2008)   I have summarized below the key components that any model for determining 
optimal AIP payments should incorporate in order to promote efficiency. In connection with each 
component the feasibility of both the (more refined) models introduced in this thesis (Smith-NERA, 
Levine and Rickman) is assessed. 
 
Firstly, to be of any real relevance the model needs to account for the actual market structure, which 
in many of the spectrum utilizing markets is far from perfect competition. The model by Levine and 
Rickman does this by assuming several oligopolistic markets whereas the Smith-NERA 
methodology relies on the unrealistic notion of perfect competition.  However, neither of the models 
explicitly considers strategic bidding by the spectrum holders; a phenomenon often leading to 
market distortions. In order for the models to sufficiently resemble reality this kind of bidding is 
assumed to be taken into account (restricted) by policy measures, i.e. it is already accounted for by 
the market setting to which the model is embedded. 
 
Secondly, the model needs to take into account interference, as interference is the main justification 
for spectrum management in general and the use of licensing as opposed to unlicensed spectrum. 
Levine and Rickman account for this by introducing interference constraints into the model utilizing 
graph theory while the Smith-NERA model in turn refrains from explicitly discussing interference. 
Thirdly, the model should allow for allocation as well as assignment of frequencies, as there are 
significant efficiency gains to be achieved in allocating spectrum to the welfare maximizing uses in 
addition to assigning them to users. Again, the model by Levine and Rickman satisfy this condition 
while the Smith-NERA method focuses on assignment of spectrum presupposing allocation 
(although the model’s extension by Indepen et al. in 2004 in practice allows for considerations of 
re-allocation).  
 
Fourthly, after it has been made sure that the model’s assumptions are in line with reality (actual 
market structure and conditions) it should also account for all aspects of economic efficiency, 
namely allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. This requirement can also be stated in terms 
of welfare maximization; the model must take into account the overall welfare, not for example 
only the private value (or producer surplus). As the objective of AIP is to impose a fee on spectrum 
users which encourages giving up un- or underutilized spectrum any AIP method inherently strives 
for technical efficiency (full utilization of spectrum) and thus productive efficiency.  The Smith-
90 
NERA method however focuses purely on productive efficiency, not acknowledging consumers’ 
willingness to pay or the revenue impact that the collection of AIP has for the government. As was 
stated previously Levine and Rickman in turn consider optimizing overall welfare consisting of 
consumer and producer surplus and the revenue generation for the government.  
 
As part of the efficiency determination, dynamic efficiency is again a concept inherently promoted 
by the idea of AIP, as it is an annually imposed and thus modifiable charge acting as a factor in the 
production decisions of the spectrum users. This differs from e.g. auction prices, which are regarded 
as sunk costs by the players when they make production decisions. Whenever AIP is optimally 
altered as time passes to reflect changes in the market circumstances or the development of 
technology (which obviously affect spectrum value) dynamic efficiency can be achieved. However, 
neither of the models presented takes a stand on dynamic efficiency and its implications on static 
efficiency leaving it a clear subject for future research regarding AIP. 
 
In addition, this thesis has identified two main directions for further studies outside the application 
of AIP. On one hand, a study on the possible deregulation of spectrum as a result of the end of 
scarcity as technologies develop could be conducted to further challenge the main presumptions and 
conclusions of this thesis as well as spectrum management in general. On the other hand, the 
depicted viewpoint of spectrum as a natural resource and what this would imply for regulating and 
pricing spectrum resources is an interesting subject as well. Both of these studies would likely have 
profound effect on how we perceive, handle and manage the existing spectrum resources.
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. The two homogenous graphs in case li=3  
Source: Levine and Rickman (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.  The two inhomogenous graphs in case li=3 
Source: Levine and Rickman (2007) 
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Appendix 3. Proof of proposition 1.  
Source: Levine and Rickman (2007) 
 
 
Appendix 4. Optimal AIP and the number of firms in the market 
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Appendix 5. Optimal AIP and spectrum re-use with spectrum scarcity 
 
Appendix 6. Optimal AIP and spectrum re-use without spectrum scarcity 
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Appendix 7. Optimal AIP and elasticity of demand for the end products 
 
 
Appendix 8. Constrained optimal AIP and the number of firms 
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Appendix 9. Constrained optimal AIP and the elasticity of demand 
 
 
 
Appendix 10. Adjustment to optimal AIP 
 
 
 
